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Preface
This handbook examines areas of cooperation between United Nations human rights 
treaty bodies and national human rights institutions. A review of a broad range of 
options for complementary activities between monitoring institutions at the national 
and the international level shows an enormous potential for improved implemen-
tation of international human rights law. Most of the examples illustrating manifold 
areas of coope ration between treaty bodies and national human rights institutions 
are based on reports by national human rights institutions from all over the world. 
Apart from publications and websites of national human rights institutions and 
from numerous documents by treaty bodies, the authors have drawn inspiration 
from discussions with the participants of the International Roundtable on the Role 
of National Human Rights Institutions and Treaty Bodies, held in Berlin in Novem-
ber 2006. Special thanks go to Jane Connors, Petra Follmar-Otto, Morten Kjaerum 
and Markus Schmidt for their input. 
Berlin, December 2007
German Institute for Human Rights
Prof. Dr. Heiner Bielefeldt
Director
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Introduction
A wide range of universal human rights norms has been codified by the United 
Nations over the past fifty years. Seven core human rights treaties have been rati-
fied by a large number of states with different political, cultural, social and eco-
nomic backgrounds, and a number of substantive and procedural protocols have 
been formulated and entered into force. At the 1993 Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights, states recognised once and for all that all human rights are univer-
sal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. States also accepted the establish-
ment of international institutions to supervise their compliance with international 
human rights law (IHRL). Thus, the protection of human rights has become a legiti-
mate concern of the international community.
In recent years, however, it has been recognised that the formidable gap that still 
exists “between the lofty rhetoric of human rights in the halls of the United Nations, 
and its sobering realities on the ground” can be closed only if all actors involved in 
human rights work strongly focus their attention on the implementation of inter-
national human rights law.1 Greater cooperation among and integration of national 
and international institutions with mandates to promote and protect human rights 
has been recognised as one central response to the “implementation crisis”.
While implementation is foremost the responsibility of the states signing and rati-
fying or acceding to a human rights treaty, the eight UN human rights treaty bodies 
(TBs) that are in operation today and national human rights institutions (NHRIs) 
play a key role in supporting and monitoring implementation. They should, there-
fore, expand their cooperation. Within the framework of the human rights treaty 
reporting process, TBs issue their “Concluding Observations” or “Concluding Com-
1  OHCHR (2005): Plan of Action submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add. 3, 26 May 2005, paras. 43-45 and para. 47.
ments” in which they make suggestions to governments on how to implement bet-
ter the respective treaty provisions in their countries. From the other angle, NHRIs 
have a mandate to monitor their governments’ compliance with IHRL, including 
their compliance with the UN TBs’ Concluding Observations. Effective cooperation 
between UN TBs and NHRIs can, therefore, greatly contribute to an enhanced imple-
mentation of IHRL at the national level. 
Recent human rights treaties like the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture (OP-CAT), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICPED) explicitly reflect the insight that greater integration and 
linking up of human rights institutions at the national and international level is 
necessary for the actual implementation of IHRL. OP-CAT and art. 33 of the CRPD 
require states to establish effective mechanisms at the national level that are respon-
sible for monitoring the implementation of these two new international human 
rights treaties.  
Despite agreement that enhanced cooperation between UN TBs and NHRIs could 
greatly contribute to better implementation of IHRL, interaction between NHRIs 
and UN TBs has not been systematic, and existing interaction has not been reviewed 
and evaluated properly. This handbook, therefore, aims to examine existing coope-
ration between the seven UN TBs – eight including the Subcommission on Preven-
tion, working on a mandate based on the OP-CAT – and NHRIs, and to develop and 
discuss ideas about how such interaction can be strengthened and expanded. 
The information compiled in this handbook is also intended to assist NHRIs and UN 
TBs to structure their cooperation with regard to all aspects of the UN human rights 
moni toring process. It is hoped that it will be useful for NHRIs to understand bet-
ter the functioning of the treaty monitoring process and how to get involved in this 
process, and for TBs to better understand the role that NHRIs can reasonably play 
in this process.
1UN Human Rights Treaties and Their Monitoring Mechanisms
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What You Can Find in This Handbook 
The handbook is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter the various mecha-
nisms of the UN TB system are explained. This includes the state reporting process 
before the TBs, the individual complaints procedures, and the inquiry procedures. It 
also incorporates sub-sections about the new procedures under OP-CAT, about the 
innovations of the recently adopted CRPD and ICPED, and about the state of the 
debate on reform of the UN TB system. In the second chapter, the main functions 
of NHRIs are summarised. Building upon the information given in chapters 1 and 
2, chapter 3 reviews existing cooperation between NHRIs and TBs, and discusses 
ways in which such cooperation can be expanded and strengthened. The handbook 
closes with a conclusion in chapter 4, summarizing current debates between TBs 
and NHRIs on their present and future collaboration. 
The handbook is designed to be of immediate practical value for NHRIs that wish 
to increase their interaction with TBs. It includes text boxes providing examples of 
good practice in interaction between NHRIs and TBs, in most cases based on activi-
ties of accredited NHRI, in some cases on ombudsman institutions that could serve 
as an inspiration for NHRIs. 
 
The information given in this handbook is drawn from documents of the eight UN TBs 
(Annual Reports, Concluding Observations, General Comments, Views, Working 
Methods, Rules of Procedure, and documents adopted by the Inter-Committee 
 Meetings / Meetings of Chairpersons of these bodies), discussions and papers that 
were made available at the Conference on the Role of National Human Rights Insti-
tutions in the Treaty Body Process held in Berlin in November 2006, documents and 
reports issued by various NHRIs, and relevant academic literature. However, not 
every existing practice of the TBs is documented, and every TB has developed a 
slightly different way of cooperating with NHRIs. In addition, interaction with the 
TBs will look different from each national context. Finally, these modes of interaction 
are continuously developing and changing. 
1.1 The UN Human Rights Treaties
As of December 2007, seven core UN human rights treaties had entered into force 
(plus associated optional protocols): 
1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR),
2.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) and its 
two Optional Protocols (ICCPR-OP1; ICCPR-OP2),
3.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 (ICERD),
4.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
of 1979 (CEDAW) and the Optional Protocol thereto (OP-CEDAW),
5.  The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment of 1984 (CAT) and the Optional Protocol thereto (OP-CAT), 
6.  The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (CRC) and its two Optional 
Protocols (OP-CRC-AC; OP-CRC-SC), and 
7.  The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families of 1990 (ICRMW). 
Two other international conventions are in the process of coming into force: the 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappea rance 
(ICPED) was opened for signature, ratification and accession on 6 February 2007, 
and will enter into force after twenty countries have ratified or acceded to it; the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional Proto-
col were opened for signature, ratification and accession on 30 March 2007. The 
CRPD will also enter into force when twenty countries have ratified or acceded to 
it, the Optional Protocol will need ten ratifications to come into force.2
2 All treaties and their optional protocols are accessible on the OHCHR’s website:  
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
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The two new international conventions and all but one of the core treaties contain 
a provision for the establishment of a treaty body that is mandated to monitor the 
implementation of the respective treaty.3 Each TB is composed of ten to twenty-
three experts who are elected for the duration of four years by the states that are 
party to the respective treaty. They serve as independent experts on an honorary or 
voluntary basis.4 
1.2 The Reporting Procedures
The seven core UN human rights treaties currently in force and the two new con-
ventions provide for states parties to report to the respective TB on the implementa-
tion of the treaty at the national level.5 Under art. 18 CEDAW, art. 9 ICERD, and art. 
73 ICRMW states parties are asked to report on “legislative, judicial, administrative 
or other measures” adopted to implement the treaties, while the other conventions 
require states to report on “measures” states have taken to achieve observance of 
the rights enshrined in the respective treaty without specifying more closely which 
measures. Some treaties call on states to report on “factors and difficulties” affec-
ting the implementation of the treaty.6 Finally, a state report should report any 
“progress” achieved in relation to the observance of the rights enshrined in the 
treaty. Reporting allows states to conduct a comprehensive self-evaluation con-
cerning the progressive realisation of the rights contained in the treaties.
3  The Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) monitors the implementation of the ICCPR (art. 28 ICCPR); the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) monitors the implementation of the ICESCR; 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) monitors the implementation of ICERD 
(art. 8 ICERD); the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) monitors 
the implementation of CEDAW (art. 17 (1) CEDAW); the Committee against Torture (CAT) monitors the 
implementation of CAT (art. 17 (1) CAT); the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) monitors the 
implementation of CRC (art. 43 (1) CRC); and the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors the 
implementation of ICRMW (art. 72 (1) ICRMW). Regarding the two new international human rights  
conventions, art. 34 (1) CRPD provides for the establishment of the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and art. 26 ICPED provides for the establishment of a Committee on Enforced Disap-
pearances.
4  The only (formal) exception is the CESCR art. 16 (2) ICESCR provides for the states parties to report to 
the UN Secretary-General, who will pass copies to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for  
consideration. ECOSOC established a working group to assist in the consideration of reports. In 1987 
this group was reconstituted in accordance with the treaty body model (see ECOSOC resolution 1985/17). 
However, the experts of the CESCR are elected by ECOSOC.
5  See art. 40 ICCPR, arts. 16/17 ICESCR, art. 9 ICERD, art.18 CEDAW, art. 19 CAT, art. 44 CRC, art. 73 ICRMW, 
art. 35 (1) CRPD and art. 29 ICPED.
6 See, for example, art. 40 (2) ICCPR, art. 18 (2) CEDAW and art. 35 (5) CRPD.
Reporting Obligations
States are obliged to present an initial report to the respective TBs, usually within 
one year after the relevant treaty has entered into force for the state party con-
cerned. Subsequently, reports are to be submitted periodically at intervals deter-
mined by the treaty itself or by the TB. Most committees decided on an interval of 
four or five years, and set the date by which the next periodic report is due in the 
last paragraph of their Concluding Observations to a state report.
All reports to all committees are composed of two parts. The first part of each report 
is the “common core document”. It includes demographic, geographic, legal, political, 
economic, social and other basic information on the country, and should be updated 
whenever major changes occur in the country.7 
All committees provide general guidelines on the requirements for the second part 
of the reports, the treaty-specific document.8 The treaty-specific documents have 
to cover all substantive articles of the treaty, including information on the state’s 
constitutional and legal framework that is not provided in the common core docu-
ment, as well as the legal and practical measures taken in order to implement the 
treaty. Where CEDAW is concerned, the current guidelines recommend that, in addi-
tion, countries should refer not only to “mere lists of legal instruments adopted in 
the country concerned in recent years” but that they should also report on “the 
practical realisation” of the “principle of the equality of men and women”.9 CEDAW’s 
reporting guidelines also demand the explanation of “factors and difficulties affect-
ing the degree of fulfilment of obligations under the Convention” and of “the nature 
and extent of, and reasons for every such factor and difficulty, … and should give 
details of the steps being taken to overcome them”.10 Even more details on the prac-
tical realisation of rights are expected by CESCR, which asks for, among other things, 
7  Harmonised guidelines on the “common core document“ were adopted by the Fifth Inter-Committee 
Meeting of the human rights treaty bodies. Cf.: 5th Inter-Committee Meeting / 18th Meeting of Chair-
persons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2006): Harmonised Guidelines on Reporting under the 
International Human Rights Treaties, Including Guidelines on a Common Core Document and Treaty-
specific Documents. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/3, 10 May 2006. States have been encouraged to use these 
guidelines. 
8  For a recent compilation of these reporting guidelines see Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and 
Content of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to International Human Rights Treaties, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/2/Rev. 4, 21 May 2007. 
9  Art. 2 CEDAW. 
10  Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to 
International Human Rights Treaties, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev. 4, 21 May 2007, para. C. 3, p. 63.
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“information on the situation, level and trends of employment, unemployment and 
underemployment.”11 
Within the framework of the TBs’ efforts to make the state reporting system more 
effective and transparent, TBs have reviewed their reporting guidelines in light of 
the “Harmonised guidelines on reporting under the international human rights trea-
ties, including guidelines on a common core document and treaty-specific docu-
ments”, or are in the process of so doing.12
It is of great importance for TBs to have sufficient information to consider the imple-
mentation of the respective treaty within a specific country effectively. Therefore, 
TBs welcome information from other sources that supplements the states’ reports. 
The media plays an important role here, but even more important is the informa-
tion provided by NGOs, NHRIs, other UN organs and specialised UN agencies. Today, 
reports submitted by NGOs form a key part of the reporting system, and all com-
mittees have developed mechanisms whereby they can be briefed by NGOs. 
Consideration of State Reports
States parties’ reports are considered by the TBs in a public session. Among other 
things, this serves the purpose of external monitoring of the human rights situation 
within a specific country, and the purpose of common targeted goal setting by the 
TB and the state party. 
The examination of the reports proceeds in several steps. Once reports have been 
delivered and distributed among committee members, most committees develop a 
“list of issues” presented to the government in advance of public examination of 
the report. Most TBs designate one or two country rapporteurs who have prime 
responsibility for developing the “list of issues” for a specific country.13 The “list of 
issues” highlights the major concerns of the relevant committee regarding the imple-
mentation of its treaty in the country under examination. It contains a series of 
specific requests for clarification on the content of the state report, but also on 
issues still unanswered from the examination of previous reports. Some committees 
11  Ibid., para. 9 (a), 27.
12  5th Inter-Committee Meeting / 18th Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2006): 
Harmonized Guidelines on Reporting under the International Human Rights Treaties, Including Guidelines 
on a Common Core Document and Treaty-specific Documents. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/3, 10 May 2006.
13  Except in the case of CEDAW, HRCttee and CERD, the identity of the country rapporteurs is public.
use the list of issues to structure the dialogue between the state party delegation 
and the TB members, and to give it a principal focus. The document is usually dis-
cussed, supplemented and approved by pre-sessional working groups or in-session 
task forces of the committees or by the entire committees.14 Governments then 
prepare the meeting with the committees on the basis of this list, either by provi-
ding answers in writing or by preparing an oral presentation for the meetings.15 The 
consideration itself lasts six hours on average and takes place as “constructive dia-
logue”. This notion was adopted to stress the non-confrontational nature of the 
dialogue, which primarily aims to assisting the state party with the implementation 
of human rights. The state party delegation may present the report according to its 
priorities before it answers the questions raised by the experts. 
The outcome of the consideration of all committees are called “Concluding Obser-
vations” or “Concluding Comments” (the latter expression being used by the CEDAW). 
The Concluding Observations are usually drafted by the country rapporteurs, dis-
cussed, complemented and adopted by the committees in closed session, and pre-
sented to the respective state party in writing. They all follow the same broad struc-
ture: an introduction where the committees emphasize positive aspects of the report 
and related developments in the country is followed by a part on areas of concern 
which are matched by recommendations for remedial action. 
On a more abstract level, conclusions are consolidated into so called “General Com-
ments”, TBs’ interpretation of the content of human rights provisions. These are the 
most important source for states parties and other actors to draw on to fully under-
stand the substance of the provisions of the different human treaties.16 
14  The CRC, the CESCR, and the CEDAW have established such pre-sessional working groups. They meet 
around five days prior to the actual sessions of the committees, and are usually composed of five mem-
bers of the committee. Logically, the country rapporteur who drafted the list of issues is a member of 
the pre-sessional working group. The HRCttee has changed its procedure slightly, replacing the pre- 
sessional working group with a Country Report Task Force which meets during the plenary sessions. It 
consists of four to six members of the HRCttee and also discusses and adopts the list of issues drafted 
by the country rapporteur. The members of the Country Task Force then take the lead in conducting the 
debate with the state party’s representative.
  The pre-sessional working group of the CAT consists of the whole committee. It has the same functions 
as the other pre-sessional working groups. The CERD does not convene a pre-sessional working group. 
Lists of issues are elaborated by the country rapporteur at his/her discretion.
15  The CEDAW, the CESCR, the CRC, and the CMW require states to respond in writing to the questions 
posed in the list of issues. The HRCttee and the CAT encourage states to do the same. 
16  Some committees, such as the CAT, have begun to invite NHRIs to workshops on the draft of General 
Comments. Oral interview with Conrado Martinez, Guatemala Human Rights Commission, 26 November 2007.
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Addressing Non-Compliance of States Parties with their Reporting Obligations
TBs often express concern about the considerable number of overdue reports.17 
States’ failure to report greatly hinders the TBs´ performance of their monitoring 
functions. Committees send reminders to states whose reports are significantly 
overdue and publish a list of non-reporting states in their annual reports.
TBs have also adopted procedures for states that don’t follow their reporting obli-
gations over a long period of time. Apart from the CMW, all TBs have started exami-
ning measures adopted by states with the view to implementing the provisions of 
the respective treaties, even in the absence of a report. States parties are notified 
about the TBs’ intention to conduct such examination based on information avail-
able to them from other sources.18 Committees then transmit provisional Conclu-
ding Observations to the respective states parties, and request states to address 
these provisional Concluding Observations in their next periodic report. 
Follow-up to Concluding Observations
Several committees have also increased efforts to continue the “constructive dia-
logue” with the state party and civil society after the Concluding Observations have 
been sent to the state party. Most committees have developed follow-up procedures 
whereby they ask state parties to submit specific information on how they have 
addressed priority issues identified in the committees’ Concluding Observations 
within a given timeframe, mostly a year after the session at which the report was 
considered.19 Others ask state parties to include information on their efforts to 
implement Concluding Observations in the next periodic report.20 In addition, TBs 
note in their Concluding Observations whether the Concluding Observations of the 
previous session have been implemented by the state parties.21
The HRCttee, CERD and CAT also appoint rapporteurs / coordinators for the follow-
up to the Concluding Observations. The follow-up rapporteurs send reminders to 
17  For a recent list of overdue reports see: OHCHR (2006): Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Pro-
posal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006, Annex 1: Facts and 
Figures about Reporting.
18  This information can come from other UN bodies or specialised agencies, NGOs or NHRIs.
19  This is established practice of the HRCttee, CAT, CERD and CESCR.
20  This is the practice of the CEDAW. This approach is also taken in the few Concluding Observations that 
have so far been adopted by the CMW.
21 This follow-up method is used in particular by the CRC.
state parties that don’t submit follow-up responses in time or send incomplete 
responses, they meet and consult with permanent representatives of states parties 
in Geneva or New York, they sometimes suggest to states parties that they should 
request technical assistance from the OHCHR in respect of implementation of the 
Concluding Observations, and they can make recommendations for other appropri-
ate action to the committees when states fall short of implementing Concluding 
Observations.22 The CERD’s follow-up coordinator has been invited to conduct fol-
low-up visits to several states parties to discuss and assess the measures taken to 
implement the CERD’s Concluding Observations. The CRC does not have a formal 
follow-up procedure because of its very heavy workload but regularly holds region-
al follow-up workshops on the implementation of Concluding Observations for states 
parties. 
 
1.3 The Individual Complaints Procedures
The individual complaints procedures at the international level complement effec-
tive remedies for victims of human rights violations at the national level. TBs’ views 
on individual complaints further develop and fine-tune IHRL, and ensure that human 
rights are interpreted consistently in a constantly changing world. The body of juris-
prudence developed through the consideration of complaints draws attention to 
specific human rights violations, makes victims more visible, and suggests concrete 
remedies. Decisions of international bodies on individual cases can guide state agen-
cies, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, NHRIs and 
individuals on the interpretation of IHRL. 
Art. 14 ICERD, art. 22 CAT, art. 77 ICRMW, ICCPR-OP1 and OP-CEDAW provide for 
an optional individual complaints procedure.23 Another Optional Protocol is cur-
rently being developed to the ICESCR. The OP to the CRPD and art. 31(1) ICPED also 
envisage individual complaints procedures, but these have not yet entered into force. 
States have to explicitly accept these procedures, by way of declaration under the 
relevant articles or ratification of the relevant optional protocols.
22  CERD recently even adopted “Terms of Reference for the Work of the Coordinator on Follow-up to the 
Observations and Recommendations of the CERD under art. 9 (1) ICERD”, in: CERD (2006): Annual Report 
of the CERD. Official Records of the General Assembly, 60th session, Supplement No. 18, UN Doc. A/60/80, 
Annex IV, 2006. CESCR is currently considering appointing a follow-up rapporteur for its Concluding 
Observations as well.
23  The ICRMW’s provisions for individual communications will become operative only after ten states have 
made the necessary declaration under art. 77 ICRMW, which is not yet the case. 
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Admissibility Criteria 
Under the individual complaints procedures, an individual who claims to be a victim 
of a violation of one of the rights set out in the treaties can submit a “communica-
tion” or petition to the relevant committee.24 Several preconditions must be met 
before a communication can be considered by the committee concerned: the state 
concerned must have accepted the relevant provisions in the respective treaty or 
ratified the Optional Protocol and recognised the competence of the committee to 
consider individual complaints. 
The communication must be compatible with the provisions of the convention in 
question (ratione temporis, personae, loci, materiae), and must be sufficiently sub-
stantiated,25 the complainant must have exhausted available and effective domestic 
remedies,26 the issue should not be under examination by another international pro-
cedure of investigation or settlement,27 anonymous communications cannot be 
admitted,28 and the complaint must not constitute an abuse of the right to complain.
TBs also accept complaints that are brought on behalf of a third person, provided this 
person’s written consent has been obtained or if the author can justify the lack of 
consent (e.g. it is impractical to gain that consent). Admissibility may also be affected 
by any reservation the state party may have made to the treaty or the protocol.
The communication does not need to take any particular form. Nevertheless, mod-
el complaint forms are available on the website of the OHCHR, which help individ-
uals to reasonably structure their complaints, and make sure that all necessary 
information is provided to the committees. This is very important, because the pro-
cedures are based exclusively on written information. Individuals submit their com-
plaints to the OHCHR in Geneva.29 
24  Legal entities can generally not submit a complaint. However, art. 14 ICERD and art. 2 OP-CEDAW 
 recognise the right of groups of individuals to submit a complaint.
25  Cf.: art. 3 OPI ICCPR; art. 4 OP-CEDAW; art. 22 (2) CAT; art. 77 (2) ICRMW; art.31 (2) (b) ICPED; and  
art. 2 (b) and (e) OP -CRPD. 
26  Art. 2 and 5 (2) (b) OPI ICCPR; art. 4 OP-CEDAW; art. 22 (5) (b) CAT; art.14 (6) (a) ICERD. It is important to 
note that complaints to CERD must be submitted within six months of the final decision by a national autho-
rity in the case (art. 14 (5) ICERD); art. 77 (3) (b) ICRMW; art. 31 (2) (d) ICPED; and art. 2(d) OP to CRPD.
27  Art. 5 (2) (a) OPI ICCPR; art. 4 CEDAW; art. 22 (5) (a) CAT; art. 77 (3) (a) ICRMW; art. 31 (2) (c) ICPED; 
and art. 2 (c) OP - CRPD. 
28  Art. 3 OPI ICCPR; art. 3 CEDAW; art. 22 (2) CAT; art.14 (6) (a) ICERD; art. 77 (2) ICRMW; art. 31 (2) (a) 
ICPED; and art. 2 (a) OP to CRPD.
29 Contact details can be found on the website of the OHCHR, www.ohchr.org. 
The Procedures before the Committees
Under the rules of procedure of the HRCtte, CAT and CEDAW, new communications 
are processed by a Special Rapporteur on New Communications and Interim Measures 
or by a working group. CERD is the only committee with an individual complaints 
mechanism that does not have a similar institution. The Special Rapporteurs on New 
Communications transmit the complaints to the states parties concerned, with the 
request for information or observations relevant to the questions of admissibility 
and the merits. If they consider that the case is ab initio inadmissible on procedural 
grounds, they can also directly recommend to the committee plenary to declare the 
case inadmissible. The Special Rapporteurs on New Communications can also request 
the state to take interim measures deemed necessary to avoid irreparable harm to the 
victim of the alleged violation – this does not predetermine the outcome regarding 
the merits of the communication. States’ compliance with interim measures is moni-
tored by the Special Rapporteurs on New Communications and Interim Measures.
States concerned are then asked to submit their comments on the complaints within 
a specific period of time (within six months under the rules of procedure of the 
HRCttee, the CAT and the CEDAW, and within three months under the procedures 
of CERD). Once the state has made its submission, the complainant has the oppor-
tunity to respond to the state’s comments, again within a certain timeframe (with-
in two months under the procedure of the HRCttee, within six weeks under CAT and 
ICERD, and CEDAW decides on the timeframe for each case individually). Generally, 
third party or amicus curiae interventions are not permitted under the procedures, 
but NHRIs and NGOs occasionally submit material relevant to the complaint through 
the complainant. Afterwards, the case is ready to be considered by the relevant TB 
in a closed meeting. Except for the final decisions of the committees (“Views” for 
the HRCttee and CAT; “Opinions” for CERD), all documents concerning individual 
communications are confidential. 
The procedure may be split into examination of admissibility and examination of 
the merits, but the TBs generally prefer to deal with both aspects simultaneously, 
to save time. Recommendations on the admissibility of a complaint and the merits 
are prepared by a working group on communications which is established by each 
committee that deals with individual complaints.
After consideration of the case, the TBs issue their “Views” or “Opinions” in which 
they explain their decision on the admissibility of the case, and establish whether 
the rights of the complainant have been violated or not. The TBs also consider com-
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plaints when a state has not replied to the TB’s request to comment on the com-
plaint within the required timeframe. If a committee finds a violation by states par-
ties, the Views frequently contain appropriate recommendations for reparation, and 
invite the state to supply information within two to three months on the steps it 
has taken to give effect to the committee’s findings.
The committee’s decisions are formulated as views; they are recommendations rather 
than legally binding judgements and do not include an appeal procedure. States are 
nevertheless expected to follow the Views issued by TBs; after all, they have agreed 
to an individual complaints procedure that only makes any sense if they take the 
TBs’ Views seriously. 
Follow-up to Views
All the treaty bodies have now established procedures for following up decisions, 
to facilitate their implementation. If a state fails to take appropriate steps to imple-
ment the committee’s recommendations, the case is referred to a Special Rappor-
teur for Follow-up on Views who considers what further measures should be taken. 
For example, the Special Rapporteur may issue specific requests to the state party, 
they may meet with a state’s representatives to discuss the action taken, and they 
can make recommendations to the committee to take further action that is neces-
sary to implement the committee’s recommendations. The Special Rapporteur for 
the Follow-up on Views of CAT and the HRCttee may also, with the respective com-
mittee’s approval, undertake follow-up visits to states parties in connection with 
the implementation of Views.
Unless the follow-up information is suppressed (in exceptional circumstances), it is 
published together with the action taken by the Special Rapporteur in a special 
follow-up chapter of the committee’s annual report. CEDAW and CERD also appoint 
rapporteurs to follow up their Views, which may recommend further action “as may 
be appropriate” to secure the implementation of their Views. 
Generally, the individual complaint procedures under the Optional Protocols to the 
ICCPR and CEDAW, under art. 22 CAT and especially under art. 14 ICERD are not 
well known and are therefore underutilised. Few states that accept individual com-
plaints publicise the availability of the procedures at the national level. Conside-
rably fewer states are party to the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR and CEDAW, 
than to the ICCPR and CEDAW themselves.30 Of 146 states that are party to CAT 
only 61 have accepted CAT’s competence to consider individual complaints under 
art. 22 CAT, and only 49 of 173 states party to ICERD accepted the individual com-
plaint procedure under ICERD.31 Even in countries that have accepted the various 
individual complaint procedures they are not used frequently. 
1.4 The Inquiry Procedures
Under art. 20 CAT and art. 8 OP-CEDAW, CAT and CEDAW may conduct inquiries if 
they have received reliable information of systematic violations of rights set out in 
the conventions. So far the inquiry procedure has been used seven times by the CAT, 
CEDAW completed only one inquiry (regarding Mexico in July 2004). Once it has 
been established, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will also 
have the power to conduct inquiries under OP-CRPD.32 Under art. 33 ICPED, the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances can, with the consent of the state party, 
undertake a visit to the territory of a state party concerned and – if it receives reli-
able information indicating that a state party is seriously violating the provisions 
of ICEPD – report back to the committee.33
In contrast to individual complaint procedures that are concerned with specific 
human rights violations of an individual (or, exceptionally, of a group), the inquiry 
procedures aim at addressing systematic violations of human rights at the nation-
al level. They do not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies. States which have 
ratified CAT or OP-CEDAW may, however, opt out of the inquiry procedure by mak-
ing a declaration under art. 28 CAT or art. 10 OP-CEDAW at the time of ratification 
or accession to these instruments.34
30  Currently, the ICCPR has been ratified by 161 states while OP-1 to the ICCPR has been ratified by 109 
states. Of the 184 states currently party to CEDAW, 87 have also ratified the Optional Protocol. For an 
updated list of ratifications see http://www.rwi.lu.se/tm/ThemeMaps.html [accessed 27 August 2007].
31 See http://www.rwi.lu.se/tm/ThemeMaps.html [accessed 27 August 2007].
32  Cf. art. 6 OP-CRPD.
33 Like CRPD and its Optional Protocol, ICPED has not yet entered into force.
34 Art. 8 OP-CRPD also allows states to opt out of the inquiry procedures under CRPD.
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The Procedures before the CAT and CEDAW
The CAT can initiate an inquiry procedure based on “reliable information” which 
“appears to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systemati-
cally practised in the territory of a state party”.35 An inquiry is, accordingly, only 
generated if systematic torture is alleged, but not for practices of other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment. In the case of CEDAW, the information 
available to the committee should indicate “grave or systematic violations of the 
rights set forth in the Convention by a State party”.36 Information initiating an inquiry 
is usually submitted to the Committees by NGOs.
Since the whole procedure is confidential and requires the committees to seek the 
state’s consent throughout, the committees invite the states parties to cooperate 
with them and to submit observations on the information received. The committees 
may also ask for additional information from NGOs, individuals, NHRIs, and UN bodies 
or specialised UN agencies.
On the basis of the information received, a committee can appoint one or more of 
its members to make a confidential inquiry. Under CEDAW’s procedures, committee 
members may visit the territory of the state party where “warranted and with the 
consent of the State Party”; 37 the CAT also allows for such country visits.38 The out-
come of an inquiry is reported back to the committee for examination. The com-
mittee develops comments and recommendations which are transmitted to the state 
party. 
Follow-up to Recommendations
CAT and CEDAW ask states to inform them (“within a reasonable delay” and with-
in six months, respectively) to respond to their findings and recommendations, and 
to give information on the action taken to give effect to these recommendations.39 
35  Art. 20 (1) CAT. In its conclusions to its first inquiry procedure, the CAT clarified what constitutes systematic 
practices of torture within a state party. See CAT (2003): Annual Report of the Committee against Torture. 
Official Records of the General Assembly, 58th Session, Supplement No. 44, Add.1, UN Doc. A/58/44/Add.1, 
2003, para. 39.
36 Art. 8 OP-CEDAW.
37  Art. 8 OP-CEDAW.
38  Art. 20 (3) CAT; and CAT (2002): Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture. UN Doc. CAT/C/3/
Rev. 4, 9 August 2002, rule 80.
39 CAT: ibid., rule 83 (2), CEDAW: art. 9 OP-CEDAW.
CAT also appointed a Special Rapporteur under art. 20 CAT who, inter alia, engages 
in follow-up activities that aim to encourage states parties to implement recom-
mendations. Both committees can, after consultation with the state party, include 
their findings and recommendations from an inquiry procedure in their annual 
reports to the General Assembly.
1.5 The Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OP-CAT) 
OP-CAT, entered into force in 2006, creates innovative mechanisms to enhance pre-
vention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.40 
It establishes the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the Committee against Torture (herein-
after referred to as the Subcommittee on Prevention or just Subcommittee). Second-
ly, every state party should have in place one or more independent mechanisms 
empowered under national law to prevent torture through unannounced visits to 
any place of detention and other forms of monitoring, the so-called National Pre-
ventive Mechanism NPM. So OP-CAT clearly reflects the insight that effective imple-
mentation of international human rights instruments can be enhanced greatly when 
international and national mechanisms for the prevention of torture work as a two 
pillar system. Through establishing a system of cooperation between international 
and national independent oversight mechanisms, OP-CAT aims to prevent any forms 
of torture and ill-treatment by systematic monitoring, even of isolated places of 
detention. 
The Subcommittee on Prevention
The Subcommittee on Prevention is authorised to visit places where people are 
deprived of their liberty (as defined in art. 4 OP-CAT, deprivation of liberty means 
here any form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a pub-
lic or private custodial setting which that person is not permitted to leave at will 
by order of any judicial, administrative or other authority) and to make recommen-
dations to states parties concerning how persons deprived of their liberty can be 
protected against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. It consists of ten international independent experts who are elected by the 
40 OP-CAT entered into force on 22 June 2006.
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parties to the OP-CAT, to be increased to 25 after the 50th ratification or accession.41 
To carry out its mandate, the Subcommittee has, among other things, the right to 
access without restriction all places of detention and their installations and facili-
ties, all information referring to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty 
as well as information on their conditions of detention, the right to move freely, 
and the right to interview persons deprived of their liberty without witnesses.42
After a country visit has been conducted by the Subcommittee on Prevention, it will 
issue recommendations to the state party. Recommendations are meant to enhance 
the protection of detainees from torture and other forms of ill-treatment. States 
are then expected to enter into a dialogue with the Subcommittee regarding pos-
sible implementation measures.43 These recommendations are confidentially com-
municated to the state party, and can be submitted to the NPM as well.44 Art. 13 
(4) OP-CAT allows the Subcommittee to decide that a short follow-up visit is neces-
sary to make sure that the state party has implemented or is in the process of imple-
menting the Subcommittee’s recommendations. OP-CAT also contains a sanction 
for non-compliance with the Subcommittee’s recommendations: the CAT may decide 
by majority vote to issue a public statement on the non-compliance of the state 
party if the Subcommittee so requests.45 Reports of the Subcommittee can be made 
public with the consent of the state party concerned.
The first members of the Subcommittee were elected in December 2006. It met 
three times in 2007 and also conducted its first two visits, to Mauritius and the 
Maldives. Visits to Sweden and Paraguay are scheduled for 2008. 
The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM)
At the national level, state parties to OP-CAT are required to establish one or more 
suitable “national preventive mechanisms” (NPM) within one year after they have 
ratified the Protocol.46 Together, the Subcommittee on Prevention and the NPM will 
build a complementary “system of regular visits” to places where people are deprived 
of their liberty to expose these places to greater public scrutiny.47 Since effective 
41 See art. 5 (1) OP-CAT
42 Art. 14 (1) OP-CAT
43 Art. 12 (d) OP-CAT.
44 Art. 16 (1) OP-CAT.
45 Art. 16 (4) OP-CAT.
46 Art. 17 OP-CAT
47 Art. 1 OP-CAT
work by the NPMs depends on a good cooperative relationship with the Subcom-
mittee on Prevention, the NPMs have the right to meet with, send and exchange 
information, and to directly (if necessary confidentially) contact the Subcommittee.48 
The Subcommittee can also offer training and technical assistance to the NPMs 
with the aim of enhancing their capacity.49 States are required to encourage and 
facilitate communication and contacts between their NPMs and the Subcommittee.50 
NPMs are currently being designated by states parties.
While states parties are generally free to determine the exact shape of their NPM 
or NPMs, the Optional Protocol formulates certain criteria which have to be fulfilled 
to allow the NPMs to carry out their function independently to the full extent.51 
As per art. 19 OP-CAT, NPMs shall be mandated to (a) regularly examine the treat-■■
ment of persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention; (b) make recom-
mendations to the relevant authorities with the aim of improving the treatment 
and conditions of detainees and preventing torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; and (c) submit proposals and observations 
concerning existing or draft legislation;
Art. 18 (2) OP-CAT requires that members of the NPMs possess the “required capa-■■
bilities and professional knowledge”; also, states parties must “strive for a gender 
balance and the adequate representation of ethnic and minority groups in the 
country,” when deciding on the membership of the NPM;
NPMs must be independent (art. 17 OP-CAT). This includes “functional” and “per-■■
sonal” independence (art. 18 (1) OP-CAT).  
NPMs must have access to all places of detention, to all persons deprived of their ■■
liberty, and to all relevant information concerning these persons. The NPMs must also 
have the right to have private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty without 
witnesses, and conduct visits to places of detention on a regular basis (art. 20 OP-CAT); 
Pursuant to art. 22 OP-CAT, NPMs have the right to follow-up on their recom-■■
mendations to competent authorities: States parties are required to enter into a 
dialogue with the NPMs regarding the implementation of the NPM’s recommen-
dations;
48  Art. 20 (f), art. 11 (b) (ii) and art. 16 (1) OP-CAT.
49  Art. 11 (1) (b) (ii) OP-CAT
50 Art. 12 (c) OP-CAT. 
51  For more details on these criteria see: Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) (2006): Establish-
ment and Designation of National Preventive Mechanisms. Available at: http://www.apt.ch/content/
view/44/84/lang,en/; and Suntinger, Walter (2007): National Präventionsmechanismen – Kategorien und 
Bewertung, in: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte (ed.) (2007): Prävention von Folter und Misshand-
lung in Deutschland. Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 27–53.
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Art. 18 (3) OP-CAT require states to make available the necessary resources for ■■
the functioning of the NPMs;
Persons cooperating with NPMs must be protected against any sanctions or other ■■
harm (art. 21 (1) OP-CAT); 
Art. 23 OP-CAT requires states to publish and disseminate the annual reports of ■■
the NPMs.
In art. 18 (4), OP-CAT refers to the Paris Principles as a set of standards that should 
be taken into consideration for the NPM which underlines the importance of their 
independence and adequate funding. The type and number of NPMs that are to be 
established within a particular state party will largely depend on the nature of pre-
existing bodies. The OP-CAT’s reference to the Paris Principles may encourage states 
parties to consider establishing their NPM within or connected to an existing NHRI, 
the functioning of which is already based on the Paris Principles. Some states par-
ties that are currently discussing the shape of their NPM envisage integrating it 
into NHRIs.52 Other options under discussion on an equal footing include the estab-
lishment of an entirely new body at the national level or the designation of NGOs, 
existing judicial offices, independent boards of visitors, ombudsman institutions, or 
parliamentary committees to carry out the monitoring function domestically. 
1.6 Recent International Human Rights Treaties  
Human rights actors all over the world welcomed the adoption of two new human 
rights treaties in 2006: The International Convention for the Protection of All Per-
sons from Enforced Disappearance was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 
December 2006. It is the fruit of years of hard work by associations of relatives of 
victims, NGOs, and key governments. – Many NHRIs from all over the world were 
involved in the process that led to the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities on December 13, 2006 by the UN General Assembly in New 
York. The activities NHRIs could undertake to support the speedy ratification and 
implementation of these conventions will be discussed in chapter 3.5.
52   For an overview of the suggestions that are under discussion in various countries see: Association for 
the Prevention of Torture (APT) (2007): National Preventive Mechanisms – Country-by-Country Status 
Report. Version of 16 April 2007. Available at: http://www.apt.ch/content/view/44/84/lang,en/. The 
overview on pp. 2-8 reveals that currently a number of states are discussing including their NPM into 
an existing NHRI.
1.6.1 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
The CRPD, opened for signature, ratification and accession on 30 March 2007 but 
not yet entered into force, reaffirms that disabled persons are fully entitled to enjoy 
human rights on an equal basis with others. 
The Convention aims to create an “enhanced sense of belonging” for persons with 
disabilities.53 This is to be achieved by ending discriminatory practices against dis-
abled people, by removing of attitudinal and environmental barriers to their par-
ticipation in society, and by promoting their participation, individual autonomy and 
independence. While traditionally, the approach to disability was a focus on physi-
cal or mental deficits of disabled persons, the CRPD promotes the social inclusion 
of disabled persons and their identity as rights-bearers, thereby contributing to a 
more diverse and inclusive society. It aims not only to remove physical barriers to 
the full participation of the disabled in society through addressing infrastructural 
deficits,54 but also to tackle socially constructed barriers that result from constant-
ly reproduced patterns of social behaviour.55
The CRPD also envisages the establishment of a treaty body: the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.56 States will be required to submit reports on 
their efforts to implement the CRPD to this committee, at least every four years.57 
A new element in the CRPD is however, that it requires states to “maintain, strengthen, 
designate or establish within the state party, a framework, including one or more 
independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor imple-
mentation of the present Convention.”58 States are also encouraged to take into account 
the Paris Principles when they designate or establish these mechanisms.59
Art. 33 (2) CRPD does not specify the exact shape of the independent national 
mechanism to promote, protect and monitor the implementation of the convention 
at the domestic level. Depending on the local legal and administrative context, such 
monitoring functions can be taken on by existing NHRIs, or new institutions may 
be established with the explicit mandate to promote disability issues and monitor 
53 Preamble, para. (m) CRPD. 
54 Art. 9 CRPD.
55 See esp. preamble, para (e) CRPD. 
56 Art. 34 CRPD
57 Art. 35 CRPD
58 Art. 33 (2) CRPD
59 Ibid. 
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the implementation of CRPD. An Optional Protocol to the CRPD provides for an indi-
vidual complaint procedure and an inquiry procedure modelled on the procedures 
in treaties discussed in chapters 1.3 and 1.4.
1.6.2 The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (ICPED)
The ICPED aims to close several gaps in the international protection and prevention 
of persons from enforced disappearance.60 It was opened for signature, ratification 
and accession on 6 February 2007. 
Art. 1 (1) ICPED establishes the explicit right of every human being not to be subject 
to enforced disappearance as a non-derogable right.61 Four elements constitute an 
enforced disappearance as defined in art. 2 ICPED: (1) detention / deprivation of liberty 
of any person; (2) carried out by state agents or with the state’s acquiescence; (3) the 
refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappea red 
person; and (4) the placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of 
the law. Art. 4 ICPED requires states to ensure that enforced disappea rance constitute 
an offence under their criminal law. 
The ICPED contains comprehensive provisions on the investigation, prosecution, and 
penalties, including limitations, jurisdiction and extradition which reflect the com-
plex and continuing nature of the crime of enforced disappearance.62 It attaches 
even more importance to the prevention of enforced disappearance. Enforced dis-
appearances are to be prevented by the absolute prohibition on secret detention 
that has been made explicit in IHRL by the ICPED for the first time, and the appli-
cation of strict criteria to all situations in which persons are deprived of their 
 liberty. 
Due to the fact that the harm suffered as a result of an enforced disappearance is 
not limited to the disappeared person, the ICPED puts forward a broad view of who 
is a “victim” of an enforced disappearance: in addition to the disappeared person it 
comprises “any individual who has suffered harm as a direct result of an enforced 
60  For a more detailed overview on the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance see: McCrory, Susan (2007): The International Convention for the Protection of 
all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, in: Human Rights Law Review, Vol.7, Issue 3, p.545- 566. 
61 Art. 1 (2) ICPED.
62 Arts. 8-16 ICPED.
disappearance.”63 This may include the family and friends of the disappeared person 
who suffer from distress and uncertainty; and sometimes the larger community that 
may be exposed to terror and fear of repetition. All victims of an enforced disappea-
rance have the right “to know the truth regarding the circumstances of an enforced 
disappearance” which includes any results of any investigation into the where abouts 
of the disappeared person. 64 In this context, states are obliged to “search for, locate 
and release disappeared persons,” and give victims “the right to obtain reparation 
and prompt, fair and adequate compensation” under national legislation.65 The ICPED 
also obliges states to take appropriate steps with regard to the legal situation of 
disappeared persons whose fate has not been clarified and that of their relatives, 
in fields such as social welfare, financial matters, family law and property rights.66 
These requirements are based on experiences showing that the absence of a clear 
legal status of missing persons can cause additional difficulties for families con-
cerned. The ICPED also contains a provision on the issue of enforced disappearance 
of children.67 
Art. 26 ICPED provides for the establishment of a treaty body once the convention 
has entered into force: the Committee on Enforced Disappearances. It is mandated 
to consider states parties’ reports, to conduct inquiries, and to examine individual 
communications.68 Regarding individual communications, states have to explicitly 
recognise the Committee’s competence.69 The Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
has several innovative procedures: it can receive urgent requests that “a disappeared 
person should be sought and found”, submitted by relatives of the disappeared per-
son or their legal representatives.70 If the admissibility criteria for this urgent action 
procedure are met, the Committee may request the state party concerned to take 
the necessary measures to locate and protect the disappeared person, and to inform 
the Committee on the measures taken within a specific period of time.71 
The Committee may also bring the question of enforced disappearance urgently 
before the UN General Assembly if it receives well-founded information that enforced 
63  Art. 24 (1) ICPED.
64 Art. 24 (2) ICPED.
65 Art. 24 (3) and (4) ICPED.
66 Art. 24 (6) ICPED. 
67 Art. 25 ICPED.
68 Arts. 29, 31 and 33 ICPED.
69 Art. 31 (1) ICPED. 
70 Art. 30 ICPED.
71 Art. 30 (2) and (3) ICPED.
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disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis in a territory 
under the jurisdiction of a state party to the ICPED.72 
The ICPED also contains a provision that is of particular interest for NHRIs: art. 28 
ICPED requires the Committee on Enforced Disappearances to cooperate with all 
relevant organs of the UN (including already existing treaty bodies), and, most im -
portantly for our context, with state institutions, agencies or offices working towards 
the protection of all persons against enforced disappearances. This includes NHRIs. 
1.7 The Debate on Reform of the UN Human Rights TB System
Despite its positive contributions to the promotion and protection of human rights 
worldwide, the UN TB system in its current form faces numerous challenges which 
prevent it from fully realising its potential to support national human rights capacity 
and accountability. From the mid 1980s on, analyses of the TB system led to a gene-
ral agreement that the system is in need of reform to ensure its long-term effective-
ness. Since any reform of the system will have implications for the cooperation of 
NHRIs and the UN TBs, the main issues under discussion should be looked at here, 
from the perspective of NHRIs. 
Some of the main problems analysts have identified as undermining the effective-
ness of the TBs are: 73 
The TB system is funded inadequately, including the OHCHR which acts as a sec-■■
retariat for the TBs. A continuously increasing workload is not met with increasing 
resour ces.
States parties do not sufficiently engage with the TB system, despite their formal ■■
commitments. This may be due to the lack of capacity or due to the lack of politi-
cal will. Complex and sometimes overlapping state reporting obligations to several 
TBs contribute to states failing to report, to severe delays in reporting, or to poor 
quality reports. 
Implementation of TBs’ findings needs to be improved. A systematic monitoring ■■
cannot be offered by international bodies. Thus, efforts to improve the human 
rights situations at the national level are diluted. 
72  Art. 34 ICPED
73  Problems of the TB system summarised here have been analysed in various reports and publications, 
inter alia in the UNHCHR’s Concept Paper: OHCHR (2006): Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s 
Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006, paras. 15-26.
The TB system is fragmented. This is due to the variety of procedural requirements ■■
developed by the currently existing seven TBs; and the lack of coordination and 
collaboration among TBs themselves, and between TBs and other actors, such as 
OHCHR field offices, other UN agencies, NHRIs, relevant state-level public adminis-
trations, NGOs, etc. This, inter alia, has sometimes resulted in the formulation of 
inconsistent Concluding Observations by various TBs that set different priorities 
and give diverging guidance to states. Concluding Observations are sometimes 
formulated in general language instead of giving clear and practical instructions 
on how to implement them. 
There is a general lack of visibility and accessibility of the UN TB system. The system ■■
is little known beyond a small circle of national and international human rights 
experts with the consequence that the TBs’ Concluding Observations are rarely 
discussed publicly or in the national and international media. Inconsistent working 
methods of various TBs are also an obstacle to the participation of NGOs and 
NHRIs in the TB process. 
Debate on reforming the UN TB system has been stimulated by the UNHCHR’s 2005 
Plan of Action and her proposal (Concept Paper) to establish a unified standing 
treaty body.74 Since the UNHCHR’s proposal was issued, several meetings and con-
sultations on reform of the UN TB system have taken place,75 and the proposal has 
been discussed by the various existing TBs.76 
Many stakeholders agree on the analysis of the weaknesses of the system, but there 
is little agreement on the solutions. The move towards a unified standing treaty 
body proposed by the UNHCHR is supported by some actors, rejected by others. 
Critics of this proposal support less radical reforms such as incremental improve-
ments aiming for further harmonisation of the TB working methods that would 
make TBs function as a unified system. Steps towards this end would include the 
74  OHCHR (2005): Plan of Action submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add. 3, 26 May 2005; and OHCHR (2006): Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s 
Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006.
75  Two meetings were held in Malbun, Liechtenstein, and one in Nottingham, UK. Cf.: UN, (2003): Report 
of a Brainstorming Meeting on Reform of the Human Rights Treaty Body System. Malbun, Liechtenstein, 
4–7 May 2003, UN Doc. A/58/123, 8 July 2003 (“Malbun I”); Human Rights Law Centre, University of 
Nottingham (2006): Report on an Expert Workshop on Reform of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies. Nottingham, 11–12 February 2006. Available at: www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/; 
UN, (2006): Chairperson’s Summary of a Brainstorming Meeting on Reform of the Human Rights Treaty 
Body System. Malbun, Liechtenstein, 14–16 July 2006, UN Doc. A/61/351, 18 September 2006, (“Malbun II”).
76  For a summary of the views of the TBs on the UNHCHR’s Concept paper see: 6th Inter-Committee Meeting / 
19th Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2007): Report of the Working Group 
on the Harmonization of Working Methods of Treaty Bodies. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/2, 9 January 2007.
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adoption of measures that aim at further harmonising and streamlining all areas of 
the TBs’ work ranging from reporting guidelines over procedural issues up to the 
adoption of General Comments. This should result in a more coherent and therefore 
more accessible and transparent TB system. Efforts to enhance cooperation among 
TBs themselves as well as cooperation with key stakeholders such as other UN enti-
ties, NGOs, and NHRIs are under way albeit at a slow pace. 
While measures will have to be taken on the structural level, particularly relating 
to better coordination between TBs, improved cooperation between NHRIs and UN 
TBs would address several shortcomings of the current UN TB system named above – 
ranging from a more systematic monitoring up to visibility – and contribute to an 
improved implementation of human rights treaties. The review of existing coope-
ration between NHRIs and TBs in chapter 3 of this publication is a step towards 
enhancing and building up this cooperation. 
NHRIs as key institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights within 
their countries have been set up by many states in recent years.77 The tasks and 
shape of these institutions vary from country to country, which is due to the diverse 
local culture, legal traditions and political systems in which these institutions func-
tion. NHRIs can take the form of human rights commissions, ombudsman institu-
tions, public defender’s offices, advisory human rights institutes, and a wide variety 
of other forms. They are established and financed by the state, but should be able 
to act independently. Ideally, NHRIs should have a mandate to engage in the promo-
tion and protection of all human rights: civil and political rights, as well as econo-
mic, social and cultural rights. 
The Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions, called the Paris Prin-
ciples, were adopted by the General Assembly in December 1993. 78 They result from 
an international workshop of NHRIs that took place in Paris in 1991. They formu-
late standards for NHRIs, and aim to guarantee their independence. Being framed 
in a broad and general way, the Paris Principles can be applied to all types of NHRIs. 
They set out competence and responsibilities of NHRIs, and reiterate the important 
role that NHRIs can play in the implementation of IHRL at the national level.79 The 
Paris Principles suggest that NHRIs should, inter alia, work for the harmonisation 
of national laws with international human rights norms, encourage ratification of 
international human rights treaties, assist in human rights education, conduct 
77  The website of the National Human Rights Institutions Forum currently lists 119 NHRIs, 63 of them 
accredited with status A without reservation. Accredition with status A means that the NHRI complies 
with the Paris Principles. Cf.: http://www.nhri.net/nationaldatalist.asp (18 September 2007). 
78  The Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (the Paris Principles) were adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. These standards provide guidance for the establishment, 
competence, responsibilities, composition and guarantees for independence, pluralism, methods of opera-
tion, and quasi-judicial activities of NHRIs.
79 See Section A of the Paris Principles.
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research into human rights issues, submit reports or recommendations to any pub-
lic administrative body on matters concerning the promotion and protection of 
human rights, and cooperate with other actors involved in human rights work at 
the national, regional and international level.80 
NHRIs can also have the function to receive and investigate complaints and petitions 
from individuals who allege that their human rights have been violated.81 Usually, 
however, NHRIs do not have the power to make binding decisions in response to 
complaints about human rights violations. But they do normally have the opportu-
nity to refer the matter to the judiciary, if necessary.
Several provisions of the Paris Principles aim at securing the independence of NHRIs, 
which is of utmost importance for NHRIs to gain public legitimacy and to carry out 
their functions effectively. Independence is not an option to choose but a constitu-
tive element: A NHRI has to be independent, and this is to be secured by sufficient 
core funding from the government. The Paris Principles suggest a few mechanisms 
to ensure independence: the exclusion of voting rights for government representa-
tives in governing bodies of the institution, “the pluralist representation of the social 
forces involved in the promotion and protection of human rights”,82 the provision 
of adequate funding,83 and the legal basis for NHRIs.84 NHRIs cooperate with human 
rights NGOs and other civil society actors; their role is different though. Normally 
working on a broader range of topics than NGOs, NHRIs rely on the practical exper-
tise of NGOs. NHRIs often build bridges and serve as a platform for discussion 
between government actors and civil society.
All accredited NHRIs from all over the world that operate in conformity with the 
Paris Principles elect an International Coordination Committee (ICC). The Committee 
has sixteen members – four representatives from each of the four regional groups 
Africa, Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific.85 While the OHCHR’s National Human 
Rights Institutions Unit and the OHCHR’s Technical Cooperation Programme support 
NHRIs in many different ways, the ICC coordinates meetings, international confe-
rences and common projects of NHRIs. It encourages joint activities by NHRIs, liaises 
80 Ibid.
81  This possible function of NHRIs is outlined in Section D of the Paris Principles which also lists particular 
obligations for NHRIs that have the mandate to receive and investigate individual complaints. 
82  Paris Principles, Section B, para. 1. 
83 Paris Principles, Section B, para. 2. 
84 Paris Principles, Section A, para. 2.
85 See http://www.nhri.net/. 
with the UN and other international and regional organisations, assists states to 
establish NHRIs and supports NHRIs by training and advice. One of the most impor-
tant tasks of the ICC is prepared by its Subcommittee on Accreditation: NHRIs have 
to be accredited by the ICC, and that means that their mandate and activities have 
to conform to the Paris Principles. The Subcommittee reviews a considerable number 
of NHRIs per annum that either search accreditation (the so-called status A) or 
re-accre ditation – the latter process being conducted at a regular interval of about 
5 years. Re-accredi tation has been introduced to make sure that the conformity of 
all institu tions with the Paris Principles is reviewed on a regular basis – conditions in 
a country or within an NHRI may change.
The Paris Principles state that “NHRIs should encourage ratification of international 
instruments and encourage their implementation, … contribute to state reports 
which are required to be submitted by states parties to United Nations bodies or 
committees … pursuant to their treaty obligations and where necessary to express 
an opinion on the subject, with due respect to their independence.”86 
The Paris Principles generally encourage cooperation between NHRIs and the UN 
and its agencies. This suggests that NHRIs can, along with local NGOs, become key 
partners to UN TBs and thereby more closely connect the UN TB system to national 
administrations and other human rights actors at the national level. The third chap-
ter of this handbook will outline the elements of fruitful cooperation between NHRIs 
and UN TBs that help to achieve maximum synergies from both parties’ efforts to 
promote and protect human rights.
86 Paris Principles, Section A, para. 3 (c) and (d). 
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The following chapter reviews how NHRIs cooperate with the various bodies and 
mechanisms of the UN Human Rights TB system, the functions of which were 
explained in chapter 1. Since this cooperation is still in its early stages, the ways 
such interaction can possibly be expanded and strengthened are discussed as well. 
However, the review and discussion of means of interaction cannot of course be 
exhaustive. Also, it has to be kept in mind that the feasibility and adequacy of apply-
ing a specific means must always be evaluated strategically by the NHRIs in the 
local context. 
3.1 NHRIs’ Involvement in the State Reporting Process 
3.1.1 NHRIs’ Involvement in the Process Prior to the Official Sessions of 
Treaty Bodies 
There are several possibilities for NHRIs to become involved in the TB process before 
the official session of a TB takes place in Geneva or New York. Activities range from 
re minding governments of their reporting obligation, urging governments to sign, 
ratify or accede to human rights treaties, to submitting their own reports to TBs.87 
 
Encouraging States to Comply with their Reporting Obligations
As mentioned above, a number of states are behind with their reporting to TBs; and 
some states do not report at all. NHRIs are well placed to use their influence to urge 
governments to take their reporting obligation seriously. A continuous dialogue 
between staff members of NHRIs and government officials may help to build and 
87  In this handbook, the authors relate to “NHRI reports” and “NGO reports”, for reasons of simplicity.
strengthen the governments’ political will to actively engage in the implementation 
of human rights.88 An NHRI can also send information on the human rights situa-
tion in its country if the respective committees intend to review the implementa-
tion of the provisions of the relevant conventions in the absence of the state party’s 
reports.
If civil servants lack the technical capacity to prepare the reports, NHRIs may facil-
itate training, offered by either international experts or NGOs or by themselves.89
NHRIs can also engage in general educational activities and awareness-raising cam-
paigns that aim to inform and sensitise government officials, parliamentarians, 
88  This is, for example, a goal of the Malawi Human Rights Commission, see: Malawi Human Rights Commission 
(2004): Annual Report of the Malawi Human Rights Commission for the Year 2004. Available at: 
http://www.malawihumanrightscommission.org/docs/2004_MHRC_AnnualReport_.pdf. 
89  OHCHR also regularly organises training activities for government officials responsible for the reports to 
TBs within the context of its Technical Cooperation Programme.
Uganda Human Rights Commission successfully urges the Ugandan 
government to produce its overdue reports to Treaty Bodies 
The Uganda Human Rights Commission was established in 1995 by Uganda’s new 
constitution. Uganda had ratified the ICERD, ICESCR, CAT, CEDAW and CRC by 1990 
and the ICCPR in 1995. As of January 2000, Uganda had a backlog of eighteen over-
due reports it had not submitted to the respective treaty bodies from 1985 onwards.
Therefore, since it started working in 1997, the Uganda Human Rights Commis-
sion in cooperation with other stakeholders urged the government to produce its 
reports. As a result, Uganda’s reporting record has improved in recent years. Since 
2003, Uganda submitted reports to the HRCttee, the CERD, CEDAW, CRC, and CAT. 
In addition, the Uganda Human Rights Commission, together with UNDP and 
OHCHR engaged in capacity development activities to enable state representa-
tives to write the adequate reports. 
Source: Uganda Human Rights Commission (2006): National Institutions and the Reporting Process 
Before the Treaty Body Session. Presentation by Mrs. Margaret Sekaggya, Chairperson, Uganda Human 
Rights Commission, at the Roundtable on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Treaty 
Body Process, Berlin 23–24 November 2006 (on file with authors); and: Reporting History – Uganda, 
available at: http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/rephistory/state/179 
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journalists and the general public for their countries’ international human rights 
obligations. Such activity is also encouraged by the General Comments of the CERD, 
the CESCR, and the CRC.90 In the framework of such educational activities, NHRIs 
may recall the primary reasons that have driven the ratification of international 
human rights treaties: In addition to the promotion and protection of human rights 
in their own territory, states wish to consolidate their democratic systems, want to 
become integrated in the international community, and to set a positive example for 
human rights protection on the global level. NHRIs may also conduct training events 
and workshops on international human rights and make sure that IHRL becomes an 
integrated part in the curricula of law schools. Generally, a greater awareness of 
the functions and purposes of the international human rights system within a country 
seems to be conducive to governments adequately meeting their reporting obligations.
 
Urging Ratification and Removal of Reservations
NHRIs can also encourage their governments to sign, ratify or accede to human 
rights treaties. Various activities that NHRIs can undertake to encourage ratifica-
tion are discussed below in chapter 3.4 with regard to OP-CAT. 
The value of a ratification is seriously diminished by reservations to human rights 
treaties.91 Many of these reservations contradict the object and purpose of human 
rights treaties, undermine their integrity, and hamper their effective implementa-
tion. NHRIs can therefore urge their governments to review and withdraw their res-
ervations, or at least bring them into conformity with the object and purpose of a 
particular treaty.92 
90  CESCR (1998): General Comment No. 10 – The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/25, 
10 December 1998, para. 3; CRC (2002): General Comment No. 2 – The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2002/2, 15 
November 2002, para. 19 (m); and CERD (1993): General Comment No. 17 – Establishment of National 
Institutions to Facilitate Implementation of the Convention, 25 March 1993. In: Annual Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Official Records of the General Assembly, 48th 
Session, Supplement No. 18, UN Doc A/48/18, 1993, p.117, para. 1 (d).
91  The reasons for this is that the regime governing reservations in general international law set out in Part II, 
Section 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is ineffective with regard to Human Rights 
Treaties. An alternative regime set out in: HRCttee (1994): General Comment No. 24 – Reservations to 
the Covenant or Optional Protocols or Declarations under art. 41 of the Covenant. UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/ 
Rev.1/Add.6, 4 November 1994, has been met with great reserve from states parties. 
92  For example, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) encouraged 
the Australian government to remove reservations made by Australia to ICERD. 
NHRI Reports and Additional Information to Treaty Bodies
Often, NHRIs have a good overview on the conformity of their government’s poli-
cies and national legislation with international human rights principles.93 In their 
working methods TBs therefore encourage NHRIs to submit their own reports or 
independent information to the TBs in order to expand the information base on 
which TBs consider states’ reports. Treaty bodies that develop indicators for the 
reporting process could draw on knowledge and expertise in NHRIs on the appro-
priateness and quality of an indicator for a given country.
93  The vast majority of NHRIs is mandated to assess whether legislation and policy in their country comply 
with international human rights principles. 
Roundtable Discussions on the CRC organised by the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) urge the Malaysian government 
to withdraw its eight reservations to the CRC
On 19–20 January 2004 SUHAKAM initiated a roundtable discussion on the CRC, 
attended by government ministries, agencies, NGOs, and some individual experts. 
The meeting discussed ways to further the implementation of CRC in Malaysia, 
and to recommend the government to withdraw its reservations. 
The meeting examined each of the eight Malaysian reservations and urged the 
Malaysian government to withdraw them or review them thoroughly with a view 
to withdrawal. This request was taken up by SUHAKAM and put forward as a rec-
ommendation to the Malaysian government.
Source: Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (2004): Convention on the Rights of the Child – Report 
of the Roundtable Discussion. 19–20 January 2004, available at: http://www.suhakam.org.my/en/doc-
ument_ resource/details.asp?id=86
NHRIs submitting their own reports or additional information to  
UN Treaty Bodies
The South African Human Rights Commission sent a detailed supplementary report 
to CERD in August 2006, available at: http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/down-
loads/CERD_Shadow%20 Report.pdf 
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Many NHRIs submit such reports or other specific information to TBs.94 TBs often 
refer to this information in their Concluding Observations. Sometimes, this allows 
TBs to strengthen the position of NHRIs and to confer recognition on NHRIs’ efforts 
to promote and implement human rights at the national level. 
When submitting reports or other information to TBs, NHRIs should consider coor-
dinating their submission with submissions of NGOs and other relevant actors of 
civil society. TB members have very little time to consider lengthy and detailed reports 
from NGOs and NHRIs. It is, therefore, essential that NGOs and NHRIs concentrate 
on giving information on matters of urgency and on issues on which they possess the 
greatest expertise.95 However, when NHRIs coordinate with NGOs and other actors, 
they should bear in mind their status as institutions independent of both NGOs and 
governments.
Assisting Governments to Prepare Reports to Treaty Bodies
Numerous NHRIs assist government departments that are responsible for writing 
their state’s reports in preparing these reports. This is recommendeded by General 
94  Information given by NHRIs may, for example, include outcomes of national inquiries into the impact of 
particular laws and policies on the enjoyment of human rights.   
95  For example, the Irish Human Rights Commission decided not to participate in the session before the CRC, 
but left this to NGOs specialising in children’s rights and to the Irish Ombudsman for Children, since these 
actors possessed greater expertise regarding children’s rights. Cf.: Irish Human Rights Commission (2006): 
National Institutions and the Reporting Process during the Treaty Body Session. Speech by Dr. Alpha Connelly, 
Chief Executive, Irish Human Rights Commission, at the Roundtable on the Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in the Treaty Body Process, Berlin 23–24 November 2006 (on file with the authors).
Comment No 2 of CRC and General Comment No 17 of CERD, which both encourage 
states parties to consult NHRIs during the preparation of reports. CERD regularly 
acknowledges NHRIs’ assistance in the elaboration of states parties’ reports. NHRIs 
may be able to offer relevant information, data and statistics on human rights issues 
to government institutions that are charged with the preparation of reports. They 
can review, advise, and comment on draft reports, and make sure that the report 
contains an adequate description of the NHRI’s activities.96 
NHRIs may also draw the attention of government officials to use the recently 
adopted harmonised reporting guidelines, and to take the relevant TBs’ General 
Comments into account when they write their reports. By promoting the new har-
monised reporting guidelines NHRIs would also support the TBs’ efforts to stream-
line their working methods. Where NHRIs do not possess required expertise to assist 
governments in the preparation of reports, NHRIs may invite experts from relevant 
UN agencies, basically the OHCHR, to engage in capacity development activities in 
this regard.
However, NHRIs should not participate extensively in the actual formulation of a 
country’s reports or even write whole reports, since this would be inconsistent with 
96  The Nepalese National Human Rights Commission, for example, regularly comments on its government’s 
periodic reports. Cf.: National Human Rights Commission of Nepal (2004): Annual Report 2004 – 
National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, p. 15.
In February 2006, the Netherlands’ Equal Treatment Commission sent a commen-
tary on the fourth Dutch report on the implementation of CEDAW. The commen-
tary also contained suggestions to CEDAW on what the Committee might ask and 
primarily discuss with the Dutch delegation. The commentary is available at: http://
www.cgb.nl/_media/downloadables/advisory%20opionion%202006%2003.pdf 
The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission in 2006 pro-
vided a written submission in relation to the Australian government’s combined 
thirteenth and fourteenth periodic report under ICERD. The submission mainly 
dealt with issues of relevance to the human rights of indigenous people. It is avail-
able at: www.humanrights.gov.au/cerd/index.html 
The Indian National Human Rights Commission urges the government 
to pay due attention to disability issues when reporting to HRCttee, 
CEDAW and CRC
In its annual report 2004/05, the Indian Human Rights Commission reports that 
it reviewed the periodic reports submitted by the Indian government to HRCttee, 
CEDAW and CRC. It found that the “reports display a lack of sensitivity in reporting 
on the rights of persons with disabilities“, and recommended to take disability 
into consideration in future reports.
Source: Indian National Human Rights Commission (2005): Annual Report 2004/05 of the Indian 
National Human Rights Commission. Esp. chapter 5, p. 90. Available at: http://www.nhrc.nic.in/Docu-
ments/AR/AR04-05ENG.pdf
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their independent status. There have been examples in which NHRIs became too 
involved in the drafting of reports, and their ability to review their governments’ 
human rights record was reduced accordingly. Many governments have human rights 
focal points in relevant ministries which are better suited to write the state’s reports. 
Encouraging NGO Reporting
NHRIs can also encourage NGOs to send their own reports to TBs. They may inform 
NGOs about the TB process by holding workshops on the procedures before various 
committees, and explain how NGOs may best prepare reports. TB members could 
be invited to these workshops and advise NGOs on how to engage in reporting most 
effectively. Given the time constraints set by TBs, NHRIs should encourage coordi-
nated or common alternative NGO reporting. In some countries, NHRIs might think 
of inviting experts from UN bodies or specialised agencies, such as OHCHR field 
offices, UNICEF, UNDP or UNIFEM to such meetings, especially if NHRIs themselves 
do not possess sufficient expertise in required fields. 
However, just as NHRIs must ensure that their involvement in assisting states to 
write their reports does not compromise their independent status, they should also 
make sure that they maintain their own institutional profile in their relation to 
NGOs. 
Interacting with Treaty Bodies’ Country Rapporteurs and Pre-sessional 
Working Groups 
NHRIs could also contribute to the development of the “list of issues” through coope-
ration with country rapporteurs of relevant TBs who are mainly responsible for the 
compilation of these lists.97 Providing information in due time for the rapporteurs 
through the secretariat is critical. NHRIs may also consider participating in the 
meetings of pre-sessional working groups or country task forces (in the case of 
HRCttee) which discuss and adopt the list of issues. When submitting relevant and 
reliable reports or other information to UN TBs, NHRIs are already likely to influ-
ence the content of the list of issues that are drafted by the country rapporteurs. 
Country rapporteurs usually base their drafts on all information before them, inclu-
97  For a chart on TB working methods see Nineteenth meeting of chairpersons of the human rights treaty 
bodies; Sixth Inter-Committee Meeting of the human rights treaty bodies, (2007), Report on the imple-
mentation of recommendations of the 6th Inter-Committee Meeting and the 18th Meeting of Chairpersons, 
Un-Doc. HRI/MC/2007/6; 29 May 2007, Annex 1.
ding on NHRIs’ submissions. However, NHRIs may consider directly addressing the 
country rapporteur with additional information on specific human rights issues if 
they deem it necessary. 
Those TBs that meet in pre-sessional working groups often involve NGOs, NHRIs, 
other UN bodies and specialised UN agencies in these meetings. This gives NHRIs 
an additional opportunity to make oral presentations or submit written information 
on relevant issues to the committees, since the discussion and adoption of lists of 
issues are often on the agenda of pre-sessional working groups. For example, the 
working methods of CESCR and CRC’s General Comment No. 2 call for NHRIs to par-
ticipate in the pre-sessional working groups of CESCR and CRC. 
3.1.2 NHRIs’ Role During the Presentation of States Parties’ Reports 
Depending on the particular working methods of different TBs, NHRIs can get 
involved, by some means or other, in the actual session during which a TB examines 
states’ reports. They can, for example, join the informal meetings with TB members 
or may be given the opportunity to make an oral presentation during the official 
session. 
Informal Meetings with Treaty Body Members 
In the practice of CESCR, CEDAW and CRC, NHRIs either join the informal meetings 
of members of these committees with NGOs, or a separate informal meeting between 
TB members and NHRIs is organised in the run-up to the official session of the rele-
vant treaty body. CESCR, for example, gives NHRIs the choice to either report to the 
Committee in an open meeting together with NGOs or, if they prefer, they may 
report to the Committee in a separate closed meeting. CRC prefers NHRIs to request 
a private meeting with Committee members including during their pre-sessional 
working group. CEDAW invites NHRIs to present their information to the Committee 
in a special time slot on the same day as the meeting between the Committee and 
representatives of NGOs.
The Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC) before CEDAW
On the occasion of the consideration of the fourth and fifth combined periodic 
report on the implementation of CEDAW in the Republic of Ireland, the IHRC 
requested CEDAW to be allowed to give an oral presentation during the official 
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Generally, NHRIs prefer to interact with TB members separately from NGOs or, at 
least, in a separate time slot, before or after NGOs. On the one hand, their status is 
different from NGOs, and they also do not want to take up time allocated to NGOs.98 
Some TB members also meet with staff from NHRIs outside formal working hours, 
for example during lunch breaks. At such informal briefings, representatives of NHRIs 
may be able to clarify and supplement information that is before the committee. 
This is established practice of HRCttee. CERD also reports that, over recent years, 
NHRIs have on several occasions taken part in such informal briefings. 
 
Participation in Official Sessions of Treaty Bodies
CERD and CMW have taken the approach of involving NHRIs in their official ses-
sions: they decided to give NHRIs the opportunity to make a statement during the 
official examination of their state’s reports, if the state party’s delegation has no 
objections. This opportunity is not even given to NGOs that have the right to attend 
the public official sessions of the TBs, but are not allowed to make any oral presen-
tation during these sessions. 
In its Annual Report 2006, CMW announced its decision to give NHRIs from states 
whose reports are to be examined the opportunity to make a statement during the 
98  In her speech at the Berlin conference, a representative of the IHRC reported that the Commission 
attended the meeting of CERD with NGOs, but did not make any statements because it did not want to 
take time from NGOs. IHRC (2006): National Institutions and the Reporting Process during the Treaty 
Body Session. Speech by Dr. Alpha Connelly, Chief Executive, Irish Human Rights Commission, at the 
Roundtable on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Treaty Body Process, Berlin  
23–24 November 2006 (on file with authors).
session. CEDAW in turn decided to allocate a separate segment during the infor-
mal meeting with NGOs to receive information from the independent IHRC. The 
Commission spoke after and separately from NGOs.
CEDAW expressed its satisfaction with the involvement of the IHRC in the exami-
nation procedure, and agreed to further discuss and develop the modalities of 
such interaction.
Source: CEDAW (2005): Annual Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women. Official Records of the General Assembly, 60th Session, Supplement No. 38, UN Doc. A/60/38, 
2005, para. 426.
official session. CERD already follows such practice, for example with regard to the 
Irish Human Rights Commission, the Zambian Human Rights Commission, the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, and the South African Human Rights Commission. 
CERD recently formalised this practice by adopting an amendment to its official 
rules of procedure. A new paragraph was added under rule 40, stating that “NHRIs 
accredited to take part in the deliberations of the Human Rights Council may, with 
the consent of the concerned State party, address the Committee in official mee-
tings, in an independent capacity and from a separate seating, on issues related to 
the dialogue between the Committee and a State party.”99   
 
Exceptionally: NHRIs as Part of Governmental Delegations
Sometimes, staff from NHRIs have been members of governmental delegations to 
TBs, or have served as advisors to their government’s delegation during the session. 
It is at the states’ discretion to request their NHRIs to participate as part of the 
99  An advance unedited version of the amendment to CERD’s rules of procedure has been made available 
to the authors by the OHCHR’s National Institutions Unit. 
The Zambian Human Rights Commission participates in the  
session of CERD
During its 67th session held in August 2005, CERD invited the Zambian Human 
Rights Commission to make an oral presentation on the second day of the official 
consideration of the Zambian state report. The participation of the Zambian Human 
Rights Commission in the session had a great influence on the content of the 
Concluding Observations: CERD positively acknowledged the fact that the govern-
mental delegation agreed to the participation of the Zambian Human Rights Com-
mission in the dialogue with the Committee. In other paragraphs, the Concluding 
Observations refer extensively to the work of the Zambian Human Rights Commis-
sion, and give numerous recommendations to the state party on how to strengthen 
the Human Rights Commission and how the state’s agencies might better coo-
perate with the Commission in the implementation of ICERD in Zambia. 
Source: CERD (2007): Concluding Observations – Zambia. UN Doc. CERD/C/ZMB/CO/16, 27 March 2007 
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governmental delegation to the TBs; however, some TBs discourage such participa-
tion as it may compromise the NHRIs’ independent role.100 For example, in its General 
Comment No. 2 CRC clearly states that it is not appropriate for governments “to 
include them (NHRIs) in the government delegation when reports are examined by 
the Committee”. Also, at the fourth Inter-Committee Meeting of Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies in 2005, TB members participating in this meeting agreed that NHRIs 
need to maintain their independence, and that they should, “as far as possible, not 
be part of the government delegations to the treaty body sessions”.101 As a member 
of a government delegation an NHRI may feel inhibited to openly criticise, or may 
feel forced to defend a government decision which is out of their remit anyway. 
Therefore, most NHRIs consider such participation carefully, and their independent 
status should allow them to reject such request from their governments if need be. 
However, NHRIs may wish to advise their governments on the composition of compe-
tent and inclusive state delegations to the Committees when the reports are examined.
3.1.3 NHRIs’ Role in Encouraging Implementation of Concluding Observations 
Implementation of IHRL is by far the biggest challenge the UN human rights system 
faces today, and it is often said that gaps in implementation endanger the whole 
system’s credibility. Therefore, the role that NHRIs play in the implementation of 
TBs’ Concluding Observations may be among the most important activities of an 
NHRI related to the treaty body procedures. There is a largely unutilised potential 
that can still be freed up for advancing the implementation of IHRL at the national 
level. Concluding Observations set out how the general and often abstract human 
rights norms are to be implemented in the context of a particular country. The 
follo wing paragraphs explore activities that NHRIs can undertake to contribute to 
the implementation of Concluding Observations.
Dissemination of Concluding Observations
TBs’ Concluding Observations hardly ever reach beyond the relatively narrow circles 
of human rights experts and politicians who are directly involved in the reporting 
procedures. Concluding Observations are rarely discussed by the media and the gen-
100   OHCHR, National Institutions Unit (2006): Discussion Paper regarding the Engagement of National 
Human Rights Institutions in the Treaty Body Process. October 2006, para. 4, p. 2. Available at:  
http://www.nhri.net/pdf/General%20Guidelines%20NIs%20and%20TBs.pdf. 
101   4th Inter-Committee Meeting/ 17th Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(2005): Report of the fourth Inter-Committee Meeting of Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Annex to  
UN Doc. A/60/278, 19 August 2005, para. 31. 
eral public; and they are frequently not even disseminated accurately among govern-
mental officials to whom they are addressed. 
Thus, NHRIs can play a very important role in disseminating and informing about 
the Concluding Observations. Many NHRIs disseminate Concluding Observations as 
widely as possible among all relevant actors such as government officials and institu-
tions, parliamentarians, lawyers, NGOs, academic institutions, etc. In particular, NHRIs 
should encourage governments to translate Concluding Observations into local lan-
guages. NHRIs can publish these translations on paper and on their websites, and 
can also explain the purpose of international human rights system. In addition, 
NHRIs can attract print, radio and TV media attention to Concluding Observations. 
Identifying journalists who are open to the cause of human rights as key partners 
might be a good strategy for NHRIs. Increased media attention on Concluding Obser-
vations will also raise public awareness on human rights and the purpose and func-
tioning of the UN TB system as a whole. 
Monitoring the Implementation of Concluding Observations
NHRIs’ mandate to monitor the implementation of IHRL in their countries includes 
monitoring the implementation of Concluding Observations. Implementation may 
require legislative reforms, changes in policies or the adoption of new policies. Occa-
sionally, it may be worthwhile to design an entire project to promote implementa-
tion of a Concluding Observation that combines activities such as publications, 
conferences and political lobbying. In countries that have adopted a national human 
rights plan, NHRIs can make sure that Concluding Observations are taken into con-
sideration in the design of these plans. NHRIs should also regularly inform the 
national parliament about their governments’ efforts (or failure) to implement Con-
cluding Observations. If necessary, parliamentarians can then hold the government 
accountable for non-implementation.
The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) presses the  
Canadian government to implement the HRCttee’s Concluding  
Observations calling on Canada to act immediately to repeal  
section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act
When the HRCttee issued its Concluding Observations on Canada’s fifth periodic 
report on the implementation of ICCPR in Canada in November 2005, it called for 
the immediate repeal of section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The dis-
48 49
3 NHRIs’ Role in the UN Treaty Body Process 3NHRIs’ Role in the UN Treaty Body Process
Follow-up Meetings with Relevant Actors
NHRIs can also engage in discussions with state organs, NGOs and other relevant 
actors of civil society on how to best implement Concluding Observations and pro-
vide advice on possible course of action in this regard. Often, Concluding Observa-
tions are formulated in rather general terms and there may be various ways to 
implement them. Also, responsibilities for implementation of specific Observations 
may not be clear-cut. Such follow-up meetings can, for example, take the form of 
conferences with the participation of representatives of relevant ministries, parlia-
mentarians, and other state institutions as well as NGOs and other relevant actors 
of civil society. 
Encouraging Capacity Development Activities by International Actors
In certain circumstances, states may be unable to implement the Concluding Obser-
vations of the UN TBs for reasons of capacity rather than political will. In such sit-
uations, NHRIs can call for international agencies like the OHCHR, but also UNDP, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM or regional organisations to support governments in the 
implementation of Concluding Observations.102 In certain situations, international 
NGOs may also be in a position to provide such services. Activities of these agen-
cies may include the organisation of conferences, trainings, and most importantly 
the implementation of technical cooperation projects.
Engagement with Follow-up Procedures of TBs 
As well as reporting on the outcomes of national follow-up meetings to relevant 
TBs, NHRIs can also engage with the specific follow-up procedures that have been 
established recently by some TBs. Most Committees ask states to submit specific 
information on the implementation of a limited number of priority recommenda-
tions within a given timeframe, or ask states parties to include information on their 
efforts to give effect to Concluding Observations in their next periodic report. NHRIs 
can encourage states to submit such specific information to the relevant treaty 
bodies on time. They may also wish to independently supplement or object to infor-
102  Sub-regional seminars on the implementation of the CRC’s Concluding Observations are, for example, 
held regularly by members of the CRC, often with the support of OHCHR and UNICEF. Usually, government 
officials, members of parliament, representatives from NHRIs and NGOs participate in these seminars.    
criminatory section excluded some First Nations people from protection under the 
Canadian Human Rights Act. By drawing on the HRCttee’s Concluding Observa-
tions and the recommendations from its own special report on that issue, the 
CHRC successfully urged the Canadian government to repeal the respective section 
of the Human Rights Act, and monitored this process carefully. The CHRC also 
monitors the implementation of the changes in the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
Source: HRCttee (2006): Concluding Observations – Canada. UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 22 April 2006, 
para. 22; and CHRC (2005): Press Release - November 4, 2005. Available at: http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/
media_room/news_releases-en.asp?id=329&content_type=2
The German Institute for Human Rights (GIHR) held follow-up 
meetings on the implementation of the Concluding Observations of 
CEDAW, CRC, CAT and the HRCttee in 2004
By chance, reports by the German government were examined by four different 
treaty bodies in 2004: by the CEDAW, the CRC, the CAT and the HRCttee. The GIHR 
organised follow-up meetings in 2004 on the implementation of the Concluding 
Observations of each of these committees. By hosting these conferences, the GIHR 
wanted to contribute to a continuous dialogue between the German government, 
civil society and international human rights bodies.
When choosing the issues to be discussed at these conferences, the GIHR selected 
Concluding Observations that were of high political relevance, touched on topics 
of public interest, or referred to more serious human rights issues in Germany.
Discussions took place between representatives from relevant ministries, civil soci-
ety, academia, members of parliament and GIHR staff. TB members also partici-
pated in the discussions. The meeting adopted conclusions and recommendations 
that were sent to the ministries responsible for implementation of the Conclud-
ing Observations and to all other relevant actors, including the relevant UN TBs. 
GIHR also engaged in follow up activities regarding the implementation of the 
conclusions and recommendations, by contacting relevant ministries in writing or 
through personal meetings.
Source: Seidensticker, Frauke Lisa (2005): Examination of State Reporting by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies: An Example of Follow-Up at the National Level by National Human Rights Institutions. Berlin: 
Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte.
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mation given by states, or they may actively engage with the follow-up rapporteurs 
that have been appointed by several committees recently. NHRIs may directly get 
in touch with follow-up rapporteurs and discuss appropriate action to trigger or 
further the implementation of Concluding Observations by their states. 
Concluding Observations Guiding NHRIs’ Work
NHRIs may also use TBs’ Concluding Observations to determine the priorities of their 
own work. Concluding Observations often shed light on the most fundamental 
human rights issues in a specific country. They may therefore guide NHRIs in their 
decision-making on how to best use their resources to improve the human rights 
situation within their countries. In other cases, NHRIs can use Concluding Observa-
tions to confirm and strengthen activities already undertaken by them. Sometimes, 
Concluding Observations mention NHRIs, or are even addressed to them directly. 
NHRIs may also encourage NGOs to organise their activities around the implemen-
tation of specific Concluding Observations, and to support their implementation in 
general. 
3.2 NHRIs’ Role in the Individual Complaints Procedures
Compared to their involvement in the states’ reporting process before the UN TBs, 
today NHRIs’ participation in the individual complaints procedures of the HRCttee, 
CEDAW, CAT, and CERD is marginal. The following paragraphs therefore develop 
some ideas about how NHRIs can increase their activities related to the individual 
complaints procedures, in addition to reviewing the available information on NHRIs’ 
involvement into the procedures. 
3.2.1 Promoting the Individual Complaints Procedures
There are several ways in which NHRIs can become involved in the individual com-
plaints procedures before CAT, CERD, CEDAW, and the HRCttee. While all NHRIs will 
somehow be engaged in contributions to an effective legal system at the national 
level that includes effective domestic legal remedies for human rights violations, 
they can also urge their governments to ratify the Optional Protocols to ICCPR and 
CEDAW, and to make the relevant declarations under art. 22 CAT and art. 14 (1) ICERD. 
Effective Remedies at National Level
First and foremost, effective remedies for victims of human rights violations must 
be available at the national level. Remedies at the international level, like the indi-
vidual complaints procedures under various UN TBs, can only handle a limited number 
of cases, and are meant to supplement national and regional mechanisms in cases 
where these mechanisms do not function properly. Many NHRIs promote a well-
functioning judicial system that is accessible and affordable for everyone, and that 
generally functions in accordance with relevant provisions of IHRL.103 Also, NHRIs 
monitor the implementation of the stipulations of human rights treaties in their 
103   Esp. with art. 2 (3) (a) and art. 14 ICCPR.
The CAT’s Concluding Observations helps the Albanian People’s 
Advocate (Ombudsman) to extend its mandate
In the 2005 Concluding Observations issued by CAT after examination of Albania’s 
initial report to the Committee, Albania was asked to allow “regular and unan-
nounced visits to police stations by the Office of the Ombudsman” to prevent tor-
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This recom-
mendation encouraged the Albanian People’s Advocate to pressure the govern-
ment for a change in the Law on the People’s Advocate of the Republic of Albania, 
and give the People’s Advocate the right to enter all institutions of public adminis-
tration, including prisons, police stations, hospitals, orphanages, etc.
In response to CAT’s recommendation and the People’s Advocate’s pressure, the 
Albanian government introduced changes to the Law on the People’s Advocate, 
broadening the People’s Advocate’s mandate as required by CAT.
Sources: CAT (2005): Concluding Observations – Albania. UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/ALB, 21 June 2005, 
para. 8(l); CAT (2006): Comments by the Government of Albania on the Conclusions and Recommen-
dations of the Committee Against Torture. UN Doc CAT/C/ALB/CO/1/Add.1, 17 August 2006, para. 14; 
People’s Advocate of the Republic of Albania (2006): Annual Report on the Activity of the People’s 
Advocate 2006, p. 37 and p. 97-185. Available at: http://www.avokatipopullit.gov.al/English/Reports/ 
Report%202006.pdf; and Law on The People’s Advocate of the Republic of Albania (Law No.8454, 
dated 4 February 1999, amended with Law No 8600, dated 10 April 2000 and Law No 9398, dated  
12 May 2005). Available at: http://www.avokatipopullit.gov.al/English/Legal%20Basis.htm 
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national law. They assess whether their state’s legislation and policies comply with 
international human rights principles.
A number of NHRIs have a mandate to conduct investigations into complaints from 
individuals who claim that their human rights have been violated by national 
authori ties, and, if necessary, to recommend measures national authorities should 
take to redress and end such violations.104 
Effective remedies at the national level can also help reduce the number of indi-
vidual complaints to UN TBs to the most serious ones that are inadequately handled 
by domestic mechanisms. This seems to be of growing importance, because the 
caseload of TBs is increasing steadily while their meeting times remain limited. In 
addition, well-functioning domestic redress mechanisms make sure that individu-
als have the opportunity to exhaust domestic remedies which is a precondition for 
filing complaints to TBs.105 However, investigations by a NHRI do not represent a 
necessary domestic remedy that has to be exhausted before an individual can 
approach regional or international mechanisms, since findings of NHRIs are, in contrast 
to judgements issued by courts, not automatically enforced at the national level.106 
Encouraging the Acceptance of Individual Complaints Procedures
Nevertheless, even for a NHRI with a mandate to handle individual complaints there 
may be situations where the use of an international complaints procedure of UN 
TBs is appropriate. As mentioned above, the individual complaints procedures under 
ICERD, CAT and the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR and CEDAW are generally 
underutilised. As the international procedures may in some cases be the last resort 
for persons suffering from violations of their human rights to seek redress, NHRIs 
should urge their governments to accept the individual complaints procedures, espe-
cially by explaining the purpose and benefit of the procedures to government offi-
104   For a useful guide for NHRIs on how to handle individual complaints see: UNDP Regional Centre for Europe 
and the CIS (2006): Guide for Ombudsman Institutions: How to Conduct Investigations. Available at: 
http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=84474ACE-F203-1EE9-BB59071A724B9348 
105   It should be noted, however, that the committees dispense with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies where the only remedies available to the complainant are without suspensive effect, i.e. 
 remedies that do not automatically stay an execution/extradition/deportation order; or when domestic 
remedies are clearly ineffective.
106    This is confirmed by decisions of the HRCttee. See, for example: HRCttee (2006): Ms. Suslila Manila 
Dahanayake and 41 other Sri Lankan citizens v Sri Lanka. Communication No. 1331/2004, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/87/D/1331/2004, 14 September 2006, para. 6.2; and HRCttee (2004): Madafferi v Australia, 
Communication No 1011/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001, 26 August 2004, para. 8.4. 
cials. NHRIs can invite NGOs and the media to support campaigns for ratification 
of the Optional Protocols and for making the relevant declarations under art. 22 
CAT and art. 14 ICERD. NHRIs can also build on relevant TBs’ Concluding Observa-
tions that frequently encourage states to agree to the relevant individual complaint 
mechanisms. In particular, NHRIs can concentrate on explaining the importance of 
effective remedies for human rights violations at the national and international 
level for the actual implementation of IHRL.
Awareness-Raising and Educational Activities 
Ignorance of, and lack of awareness about, the existence of complaints procedures, 
even among lawyers, seriously inhibits their use. This is true in particular for emerging 
democracies and developing countries. NHRIs can, therefore, organise educational 
activities and awareness-raising activities on the individual complaints procedures. 
These may include seminars on the procedures for government officials from rele-
vant state agencies, for lawyers or for NGOs. Information on the procedures could 
be made available on their websites, and could also be distributed in form of printed 
material to the interested public and the media. NHRIs could encourage the media 
to report extensively on a successful case, since this may help to “kick-start” the 
process. Furthermore, NHRIs can make sure that IHRL (including the purpose and 
functioning of the individual complaints procedures) is included in the curricula of 
law schools, Bar and advocates associations and judicial academies in their coun-
tries. 
The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka urges the Sri Lankan
government to ratify the ICCPR-OP1
In its Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, the HRCttee welcomed the state par-
ty’s ratification of ICCPR-OP1. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka had 
lobbied for the ratification of the Optional Protocol, and in 2002 it organised a 
training workshop on the procedure under the ICCPR-OP1 in cooperation with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Source: HRCttee (2003): Concluding Observations – Sri Lanka. UN Doc. CCPR/CO/79/LKA, 1 December 
2003, para. 6.
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3.2.2 NHRIs’ Role in the Procedures Before the Committees
NHRIs can also become involved in the actual procedures before the relevant UN 
TBs in various ways. They could assist individuals to file complaints and monitor the 
implementation of interim measures that may be imposed by TBs in order to avoid 
irreparable harm to victims of alleged violations. 
Assisting Individuals to File Complaints
NHRIs can offer support with filing a complaint to a TB to individuals who claim 
that their rights have been violated and / or their lawyers. At the request of com-
plainants, NHRIs can give advice to individuals on the appropriate treaty body or 
admissibility of the petition. Where NHRIs have the powers to review individual 
complaints themselves, they might wish to encourage individuals to use this pro-
cedure before they address international institutions, with the view to relieving the 
caseload of the international and regional bodies. NHRIs may also intervene in 
domestic human rights litigations that can be informed by human rights principles 
in the various treaties through submitting amicus briefs or other submissions on 
the interpretation and application of IHRL. Also, depending on the merits of the 
complaint, European, American or African NHRIs may suggest individuals to com-
plain instead to regional human rights courts / commissions, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights,107 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights / Inter-
American Court of Human Rights,108 or the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights,109 provided their countries have ratified the relevant regional instruments.
In cases where a complaint to one of the UN TBs seems to be the most promising 
option to seek redress for an alleged human rights violation, NHRIs can further 
advise individuals to which of the four TBs the complaint should be sent. NHRIs 
should then make sure that complaints submitted to UN TBs fulfil all admissibility 
criteria that were outlined above in chapter 1.3. In certain circumstances, NHRIs may 
107   Under art. 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights individuals who claim to be a victim of a 
violation of the rights set out in the ECHR or a protocol thereto can send applications to the European 
Court of Human Rights.
108   The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights receives, analyses and investigates individual petitions 
which allege human rights violations, pursuant to articles 44 to 51 of the American Convention of Human 
Rights. According to art. 61 (2), the Commission can submit a case to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
109   The African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights provides for an individual complaint mechanism in 
arts. 55 and 56.
wish to strongly support a specific complaint that is exemplary for systematic viola-
tions of particular human rights within their country. 
Interacting with Treaty Bodies’ Special Rapporteurs on New Communications 
and Interim Measures through the Complainant
With the explicit consent of the complainant and only through him or her, NHRIs 
can become involved in the interaction between the Special Rapporteur on New 
Communications and Interim Measures and the complainant. They can, for example, 
help individuals to submit relevant additional information clarifying the admissibility 
or the merits of their petitions, when Special Rapportuers request such information. 
In some cases, NHRIs themselves might have conducted an investigation into the 
incidents under consideration which they can make available to the complainant. 
Since third party or amicus curiae interventions are not generally permitted under 
the individual complaints procedures, NHRIs cannot directly interact with the Special 
Rapporteurs, but can provide information through the complainant. 
Human Rights Committee uses findings of the Swedish Parliamentary 
Ombudsman in its View on Mohammed Alzery v Sweden  
(Communication No. 1416/2005)
In Mohammed Alzery v Sweden the HRCttee found, inter alia, a violation of art. 7 
ICCPR (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment). After having obtained diplomatic assurances that the complainant would 
not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment in Egypt, the Swedish government decided to deport the complainant to 
Egypt. Before the complainant was flown to Cairo, Swedish Security Police handed 
him over to American and Egyptian security agents who subjected him to what 
was termed a “security search” at Stockholm-Bromma airport. The foreign security 
agents cut off the complainant’s clothes, took photographs, handcuffed him and 
chained his feet, gave him some form of tranquilliser and placed him in diapers. 
He was then dressed in overalls, blindfolded and hooded, and his feet were bare. 
In the aircraft, the complainant was placed on the floor in an awkward and painful 
position, with chains restricting further movements. Swedish Security Police did 
not intervene with the “security search”. In Cairo, the complainant was handed 
over to Egyptian military security.
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Monitoring Compliance with Interim Measures
NHRIs can also play an important role in monitoring the implementation of interim 
measures that may be imposed by Special Rapporteurs on New Communications 
and Interim Measures when there is a danger that irreparable harm will be caused 
to the complainant. An example may be cases that relate to the expulsion or extra-
dition of individuals to countries where they risk to be subjected to torture or other 
forms of ill-treatment, or where the complainant has been sentenced to death. 
Under certain conditions, NHRIs can prevent serious human rights violations when 
they actively plead for the implementation of interim measures by their governments. 
3.2.3 NHRIs’ Role in the Follow-up to Views
With the approval of the complainant, NHRIs can contribute greatly to the actual 
implementation of UN TBs’ Views of petitions which to date remains unsatisfactory. 
Urging the Implementation of Views
As with Concluding Observations, implementation of Views begins with raising the 
level of awareness about the decisions of UN TBs. NHRIs can translate Views into 
local languages, publish them on their websites or encourage relevant ministries to 
publish them on their websites, and communicate the TBs’ findings to the media. 
NHRIs can also make sure that those public authorities which have been directly 
involved in a specific case or are generally responsible for the implementation of 
international decisions are adequately informed about the decisions of relevant 
committees, and become fully aware of their responsibility to implement them.110 
In certain cases, the implementation of Views may require the changing of nation-
al legislation and / or policies.
An NHRI can advise its government on questions of payment of compensation, 
including on the determination of the quantum of such compensation.111 NHRIs can 
110   According to art. 2 (3) (a) ICCPR; art. 13 and 14 CAT; art. 6 ICERD.
111   This is, for example, done by the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka on a regular basis. Cf.: HRCttee 
(2006): Follow-up response by the Government of Sri Lanka to the View Kankanamge v Sri Lanka,  
UN Doc. A/60/40, Vol. II, Annex VII. 
Substantiating its View, the HRCttee relied heavily on findings of the Swedish 
Parlia mentary Ombudsman who had conducted a thorough investigation into the 
incidents at Stockholm-Bromma airport. This was possible because the complai-
nant’s counsel specifically introduced the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s findings in 
her correspondence with the Committee. 
Even before the HRCttee adopted its decision in this case, the Swedish govern-
ment had already adopted clear guidelines for the enforcement of expulsion orders 
for aliens in response to the findings of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. 
Source: HRCttee (2006): Mohammed Alzery v Sweden. Communication No. 1416/2005, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/88/D/1416/2005, 10 November 2006.
The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC) relied on jurisprudence of the HRCttee in its finding that 58 
federal laws were in breach with Australia’s human rights obligations
In 2007, HREOC’s Same-Sex Same-Entitlements Inquiry found that 58 federal laws 
breached the human rights of more than 20,000 same-sex couples in Australia. 
In its finding, the HREOC relied on the jurisprudence of the HRCttee in two com-
munications from Australia (Toonen v Australia and Young v Australia), since these 
cases made clear that the ICCPR prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.
The Young case was particularly relevant to the Inquiry because it the HRCttee 
concludes that a law differentiating between same-sex and opposite-sex de facto 
couples in accessing financial entitlements generally is a discrimination under art. 
26 of the ICCPR.
HREOC’s Same-Sex Same-Entitlements Inquiry recommended to the Australian 
government that omnibus legislation be introduced to remove the 58 discrimina-
tory federal laws. 
Source: Authors’ correspondence with the President of the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportu-
nities Commission, The Hon. John von Doussa; HRCttee (1994): Toonen v Australia. Communication 
No 488/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, 31 March 1994; HRCttee (2003): Young v Australia. 
Communication No 941/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, 6 August 2003.   
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also inform parliaments about non-implementation of Views so that parliamenta-
rians can take up the issue if necessary. 
NHRIs can also help to make sure that their governments report back, in a satisfac-
tory manner, to the relevant committees on measures taken to implement the com-
mittees’ Views. Often, follow-up replies to the committees lack the required detail: 
governments simply provide general information which is not related to the circum-
stances of a particular petition, and do not address the concrete recommendations 
of the committees to offer effective remedies to complainants. NHRIs could inter-
vene and urge their government to take these follow-up reporting obligations seri-
ously, and provide the required, sufficiently detailed information to the committees 
in a timely manner. If necessary, NHRIs might decide to send alternative or supple-
mentary information to TBs, or encourage and assist the complainant in sending 
such information.112  
Interacting with the Treaty Bodies’ Special Rapporteurs for the  
Follow-up to Views
NHRIs can also consider interacting with Special Rapporteurs for Follow-up to Views 
with the aim of making governments comply with the decisions of the committees. 
They can make sure that reminders sent by Special Rapporteurs of the Committees 
are given due attention by the government. Moreover, when Special Rapporteurs 
for the Follow-up to Views hold meetings with representatives of states parties or 
with permanent missions to the UN, NHRIs can support the Special Rapporteurs in 
their efforts to point out the political costs of non-cooperation to government offi-
cials, or to encourage governments to accept technical assistance or advice from 
OHCHR in implementing the Views. NHRIs can also cooperate with Special Rappor-
teurs for the Follow-up to Views when they decide to conduct a country visit with 
the consent of the respective government.113 
112   It should be noted, however, that the HRCttee for example does not treat such “alternative or supple-
mentary follow-up information” as official follow-up documentation.
113   For example, in 1995 the HRCttee’s Special Rapporteur for the Follow-up to Views visited Jamaica to 
discuss the implementation of Views with the Jamaican authorities and the parliamentary ombudsman. 
Cf.: Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, 
Supplement No.40, UN Doc. A/50/40, 8 October 1995, paras. 557–562. 
Encouraging the Enactment of Enabling Legislation
The lack of enforcement of the committees’ Views often prevents victims of human 
rights violations obtaining monetary compensation or having their former national 
sentences reviewed when UN TBs have found a violation of provisions of the rele-
vant human rights instruments.
Several countries, among them Colombia, Finland and Spain, have established an 
effective mechanism that guarantees the implementation of the TBs’ Views.114 They 
have adopted enabling legislation that gives TBs’ Views on petitions a defined status 
under domestic law, and therefore allows victims to obtain redress through local 
courts or administrative bodies. Since lack of enforcement at the national level 
greatly undermines the effectiveness of the individual complaints procedures, NHRIs 
should strongly encourage their states to enact such enabling legislation. However, 
NHRIs may meet political resistance when promoting enabling legislation. 
114   Finland, Spain and Colombia are three of the rare exceptions. Finland allows compensation to be 
sought before administrative courts on the basis of a finding of a violation by the HRCttee. The ministry 
responsible for the violation has to pay the compensation in question. See: Niemi, Heli (2003): National 
Implementation of Findings by United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies – A Comparative Study. 
Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, p. 52. 
The Colombian NHRI (Defensor del Pueblo de la República de  
Colombia) urges the Colombian government to adopt enabling 
legislation (Law 288) in 1996
Under the Colombian Law 288, victims of human rights violations that have been 
recognised by the Inter American Commission on Human Rights IACHR or HRCttee 
can claim monetary compensation from the Colombian government. Compensa-
tion is provided when a special Committee of Ministers, composed of the heads 
of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence issue a ‘favour-
able view’ for compensation after they reviewed the decision of the HRCttee or 
IACHR. When such ‘favourable view’ is issued, a conciliation hearing is scheduled 
between the government and the victim. Once an agreement is reached, it is proved 
by an administrative tribunal of its legality. The resulting administrative decision 
is enforceable under Colombian law. 
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3.3 NHRIs’ Role in the Inquiry Procedure
The inquiry procedure under art. 20 CAT and art. 8 OP-CEDAW, aiming at investi-
gating and addressing specific, but lasting and systematic violations of provisions 
of these two conventions, is underutilised. Human rights actors have paid little 
attention to these procedures. NHRIs could certainly use this procedure more fre-
quently as a means to address systematic human rights violations within their coun-
tries. The following paragraphs develop some ideas in this regard, and review infor-
mation on NHRIs’ involvement in inquiry procedures that have been conducted by 
the CAT and the CEDAW. 
3.3.1 NHRIs’ Role in Initiating an Inquiry
In order to promote use of inquiry procedures of CAT or CEDAW, NHRIs can, for 
example, widely publicise the inquiry procedure. They may submit information to a 
TB regarding an ongoing inquiry or they can encourage NGOs or other actors involved 
in human rights work to initiate such procedures.
 
Information and Awareness-Raising
As is the case for the state reporting procedure and the individual complaints pro-
cedures, there is little knowledge of the inquiry procedures beyond a narrow circle 
of human rights experts. Providing information about the purpose and function of 
the inquiry procedures can, therefore, promote greater use of these procedures. 
NHRIs can use appropriate tools, ranging from printed and online information to 
If no voluntary agreement on the nature and extent of redress is reached, a com-
petent administrative tribunal can determine the amount to be paid as compen-
sation. If the Committee of Ministers refrains from issuing a ‘favourable view’, the 
victim may initiate a hearing within the ordinary administrative court system.
The Colombian NHRI, the Defensor del Pueblo de la República de Colombia, had 
successfully urged the Colombian government to adopt this enabling legislation 
from the beginning of the 1990s.
Source: The Colombian Law 288 is reviewed by: Heyns, Christof and Viljoen, Frans, 2002: The Impact 
of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, The Hague: Kluwer Law
informational seminars for NGOs, interested individuals or government officials. The 
specific feature of the inquiry procedure that aims at combating specific but syste-
matic human rights violations can in particular be used by (groups of) specialised 
NGOs. 
NHRI´s Role in the Initiation of an Inquiry Procedure
If their respective governments have accepted the procedure, NHRIs may also con-
sider submitting information that might lead to inquiry procedures themselves, or 
they might wish to encourage NGOs or other representatives of civil society to ini-
tiate these procedures. In particular, they may offer briefings and other information 
to a TB to provide them with further background on the issues at stake.
NHRIs might be well placed to provide the CAT with reliable information that substan-
tiate “well-founded indications” that torture is “systematically practised” within a 
state, especially those with a mandate to visit detention facilities, or those that 
have the power to consider complaints from individuals. NHRIs may also possess 
information on “grave and systematic” violations of women’s rights set out in 
CEDAW. NHRIs may advise actors who consider initiating an inquiry procedure 
whether this is the most appropriate tool to respond to systematic human rights 
violations as this depends on the individual political context in a country.
In any case, NHRIs can assist NGOs to provide the most detailed and relevant infor-
mation possible to the committees, so that the committees can open an inquiry. 
With respect to a complaint to CAT, NHRIs can help to make sure that the acts 
described comply with the definition of torture in art. 1 CAT, since systematic prac-
tice of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not covered by the 
inquiry procedure under CAT. Ideally, information submitted to CAT should contain 
a large number of concrete examples of torture. In this context, NHRIs might con-
sider assisting NGOs in collecting the required evidence, or passing their own infor-
mation on to relevant actors. In cases where NGOs or other actors want to initiate 
a procedure under CEDAW, NHRIs might help to ensure that the information proves 
that violations of CEDAW occur in a “grave and systematic” manner within a state.115
NHRIs can also give background information to TBs or enable NGOs to give infor-
mation that relates to possibly relevant facts, for example on any form of systema-
115  Art. 8 OP-CEDAW.
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tic discrimination, a history of ethnic tensions or conflicts, inadequacies in existing 
legislation, or the court system of a specific country.116 Especially when the CAT or 
CEDAW request “additional relevant information” before they invite the state party 
concerned to cooperate in examination of the information before the committees, 
NHRIs may seize the opportunity to give further relevant information to the commit-
tees. 
3.3.2 NHRIs’ Role During the Inquiry Procedure
After CEDAW or CAT decide to initiate an inquiry and to request the state to coope-
rate in the procedure, NHRIs can become involved in various ways: they may urge 
their governments to cooperate with the committee in the context of the proce-
dure, including accepting that members of the committee conduct a country visit. 
If a state agrees to accept a country visit, NHRIs can provide the relevant committee 
with information about which government institutions, organisations or individu-
als the committee members should contact and talk to during their visits, and insist 
that they themselves are visited by the committee members.
Urge Governments to Cooperate with the Committees
If the CAT or CEDAW plan to initiate an inquiry with respect to a certain state party, 
NHRIs may use their contacts to public officials to convince them of the benefit of 
cooperation with the committees in the procedure. They may wish to explain the 
purpose of the whole procedure to officials, and remind them of their obligation to 
cooperate with the committee, which is a consequence of the state’s ratification of 
OP-CEDAW and CAT. NHRIs may also underline a constructive understanding of the 
procedure – that of dialogue and cooperation with international experts. Following 
these arguments, NHRIs may also urge their governments to accept a country visit 
of several committee members. The advantages of a country visit should be obvious: 
it will provide more factual knowledge to TB members, give opportunities to discuss 
structural problems behind alleged violations, and should lead to effective and usable 
recommendations to the state party. 
116   Joseph, Sarah, et al., (2006): A Handbook on the Individual Complaints Procedures of the UN Treaty 
Bodies. Geneva: World Organisation against Torture, p. 127.
Facilitating TB Members Country Visits
When governments have agreed to receive members of the committees in their 
countries, NHRIs should make sure that they have the opportunity to meet with the 
committees’ representatives. NHRIs should be allowed to have thorough discussions 
with the committee members. Discussions should enable them to give all relevant 
information to the committee members. If an NHRI has local offices in a region 
where human rights violations examined in the inquiry take place, NHRIs should 
make sure that members of the committees visit these offices as well.
When committee members plan their country visits, NHRIs can also submit sugges-
tions to the committees on which government institutions, NGOs, individuals (includ-
ing victims of the alleged systematic human rights violations, detainees, lawyers, 
etc.), and other institutions the committee members should contact and visit during 
their stay in the respective country. NHRIs may be well placed to make such sugges-
tions, since they mostly have a good overview of the government structures in their 
country, are familiar with civil society actors including NGOs, and they may have 
contacts to individuals who have suffered from human rights violations that are 
the subject of the inquiry procedure.
Moreover, NHRIs can help to make sure that governments accept general principles 
for a country visit that allow the committee members to carry out their programme 
of work effectively. Such general principles may include unrestricted access to any 
places where persons are deprived of their liberty, unrestricted access to any written 
documents that members of the committees might feel useful to consult, and the 
possibility to conduct interviews and have private conversations with anybody, 
including with detainees. 
During their visit to Mexico, members of CAT met extensively with 
representatives of the Mexican National Human Rights Commission 
(CNDH) and visited its district offices in several states
In 1998 the CAT received a report that contained information on systematic prac-
tise of torture in Mexico from the Mexican NGO Human Rights Centre Miguel 
Augustin Pro-Juarez (PRODH) based in Mexico City. The Committee found this 
information reliable and initiated an inquiry procedure under art. 20 CAT. With 
the agreement of the government of Mexico, two members of the CAT conducted 
a country visit to Mexico in August / September 2001.
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3.3.3 NHRIs’ Role in the Implementation of the  
Committees’ Recommendations 
When CAT or CEDAW issue recommendations on how states should redress system-
atic practices of torture or violations of CEDAW in their reports on an inquiry, and 
the state agrees to the publication of those, NHRIs can engage in supporting the 
implementation of these recommendations through various activities. In any case 
though, NHRIs can urge the government to publish the results of the procedure. 
Informing about Recommendations
Should the government have agreed to the publication, NHRIs may inform the gene-
ral public about the TBs’ recommendations following an inquiry procedure, and 
especially engage with government officials and bodies who are addressed by the 
recommendations. Similar to NHRIs’ activities related to the implementation of 
Concluding Observations discussed above, NHRIs can, for example, organise meetings 
or roundtable discussions with all relevant actors that play a role in the implemen-
tation of the recommendations. Participants may, for example, discuss approaches 
and policies for implementing the recommendations, and define each actor’s respon-
sibility in this process. Compared to Concluding Observations, recommendations 
issued by the committees in the process of an inquiry procedure are generally more 
detailed and relate to more concrete, albeit systematic and often widespread, human 
rights violations within a specific country. Often, several recommendations address 
specific problems related to practices or omissions of specific government institu-
tions or administrative bodies that cause such violations. In this context, NHRIs 
should urge these bodies to take the recommendations seriously, and to effect the 
required changes with due diligence. 
Follow up Implementation of Recommendations
NHRIs can also monitor their governments’ compliance with the TBs’ request to 
inform the committees about measures that have been taken to give effect to the 
recommendations within a defined period of time. NHRIs can check whether their 
governments send such information, for example through contacting the Special 
Rapporteur on art. 20 of the CAT, or by otherwise contacting members of the com-
mittees or the secretariat. NHRIs may also wish to give supplementary or alterna-
tive information to the Rapporteur on art. 20 CAT or the entire CAT or CEDAW, in 
cases where the information given by their governments is inadequate. Such infor-
mation can also be included in reports NHRIs may consider sending to TBs in the 
context of the next periodic report.  
Using TBs’ Recommendations in NHRIs’ Work 
In certain situations, NHRIs might use recommendations to underpin demands for 
the extension of their mandates, for example carrying out regular visits to their 
country’s detention facilities with the aim of preventing torture. An extension of their 
mandate should then imply an enlargement of their budget.
During their visit, the CAT members met extensively with representatives from the 
Mexican National Human Rights Commission and its District Human Rights Com-
missions in several federal states (Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Tamaulipas and Oaxaca). 
In all of these discussions, the Human Rights Commissions provided the Committee 
members with all relevant documentation and information: their annual reports; 
information related to individual cases that have been subject to investigations 
by the National or District Human Rights Commissions; information related to 
several main factors that indicated that torture was systematically practised in 
Mexico, such as inadequately trained police officers and members of the army, 
impunity of police officers who practise torture, the length of time limits to hand 
detainees over to a court authority, the use of evidence obtained by torture in the 
criminal proceedings, lack of independence of medical experts of the Public Prose-
cutor’s Office, etc. 
The information provided by the Mexican National and District Human Rights 
Commissions contributed greatly to the elaboration of CAT’s recommendations to 
the government of Mexico. In its response to the Committee’s recommendations, 
the government of Mexico indicated that it had, among other things, adopted a 
new policy with regard to the administration of justice that aimed at better imple-
mentation of the National and District Human Rights Commissions’ recommen-
dations relating to combating and preventing torture. 
Source: CAT (2003): Report on Mexico produced by the Committee under art. 20 of the Convention, 
and Reply from the Government of Mexico. UN Doc. CAT/C/75, 2003.
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3.4 NHRIs’ Role Under the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture
As outlined above (in chapter 1.5), OP-CAT offers new opportunities for cooperation 
between international and national bodies to prevent torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment at the domestic level, includ-
ing for cooperation between existing NHRIs and the newly established Subcommit-
tee on Prevention. In the following, various activities that NHRIs can undertake to 
encourage ratification and implementation of OP-CAT are discussed. As OP-CAT 
ranks among the international human rights instruments that have been adopted 
only very recently, relatively little information on NHRIs’ activities related to OP-CAT 
is so far available. Therefore, the following sections rather outline some approaches 
NHRIs might reasonably take to encourage the ratification and implementation of 
OP-CAT in the near future. Approaches discussed here are by no means exhaustive. 
The Committee Against Torture’s recommendations issued in the 
context of an inquiry on Peru bring about greater competences for 
the Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú (Peruvian Ombudsman Office)
After a country visit to Peru by two members of the Committee against Torture in 
August/September 1998 to verify information before the Committee containing 
indications that torture was systematically practised in Peru, CAT issued its rec-
ommendations to the state party on how to address these human rights violations. 
It recommended that the Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú “should be given the legal 
powers and human and material resources necessary for ensuring that every 
detainee is able to avail himself of it from the time pre-trial detention is 
ordered.”
In response to this recommendation, the Peruvian government restructured the 
Public Defender system. Among other changes, a Team for the Protection of Human 
Rights in Police Stations was established within the Ombudsman’s Office. The Team 
has the responsibility to verify situations of detainees in police stations. 
Source: CAT (2001): Annual Report of the Committee against Torture. Official Records of the General 
Assembly, 56th Session, Supplement No. 44, UN Doc. A/56/44, paras. 144–193.
3.4.1 NHRIs’ Role in Promoting Ratification of OP-CAT
NHRIs have an important role to play in encouraging and pressurising their states 
to sign and ratify OP-CAT. To this end, they can engage in a wide range of activities. 
Conducting Research into the Legal and Factual Situation in  
Places of Detention
If NHRIs want to start a successful advocacy campaign for the ratification of OP-CAT, 
it is an essential precondition that they possess a good overview of the legal and 
factual situations in differing places where people are deprived of their liberty. 
Research should cover the existing legal regimes that are applicable to various places 
where people are deprived of their liberty, such as police stations, remand centres, 
prisons, military prisons, juvenile prisons, centres of detention for illegal migrants 
and asylum seekers, psychiatric institutions, closed institutions for minors, elderly 
people’s homes, and others, depending on the context of a particular country. 
Research should also identify possible structural problems that occur or are likely 
to occur with regard to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, and identify and 
evaluate existing monitoring mechanisms and complaint procedures in places of 
detention. Such analysis can serve as a basis for an advocacy campaign for the rati-
fication of OP-CAT, since it may substantiate the necessity for the establishment or 
designation of an NPM in order to prevent torture and other forms of ill-treatment 
within a specific country. Baseline research on the factual situations in places of 
detention can also identify gaps in the availability of empirical data and therefore 
stimulate further research in this context. 
Advocacy Campaigns for the Ratification of OP-CAT
On the basis of their knowledge about the legal and factual situation in places where 
people are deprived of their liberty, NHRIs can start an advocacy campaign for the 
ratification of OP-CAT, as the case may be in cooperation with interested NGOs. 
Various activities can be undertaken within the context of such an advocacy campaign:117 
117   Strategies for NHRIs to effect the ratification and implementation of OP-CAT discussed in this and the 
following section are mainly based on suggestions of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights 
(IIHR) and the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT). See: Inter-American Institute of Human 
Rights/Association for the Prevention of Torture (2004): Optional Protocol to the United Nations Con-
vention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – A Manual 
for Prevention, Lyon: Imprimerie Rhodaneinne; especially Chapter V, “Strategies for the Ratification and 
Implementation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture”, p. 141–164. 
68 69
3 NHRIs’ Role in the UN Treaty Body Process 3NHRIs’ Role in the UN Treaty Body Process
NHRIs can conduct awareness-raising campaigns about the purpose of OP-CAT 
among the legislative and executive branch and other public authorities. In the 
context of such a campaign, NHRIs can identify parliamentarians from national and 
regional parliaments who are open for the cause of human rights, such as members 
of parliamentary human rights committees or committees on foreign affairs, and 
encourage them to argue for the ratification of OP-CAT. For example, they can urge 
these committees to initiate a hearing on torture prevention in the respective coun-
try, during which specific structural problems can be discussed openly.
With regard to the executive branch, NHRIs may contact relevant ministries, such 
as the ministry of justice and the ministry of foreign affairs, that may help to con-
vince the government to ratify OP-CAT. In addition, NHRIs may identify departments 
within the executive that are likely to play a role in designating or establishing one 
or several NPMs, and encourage them to support the ratification of OP-CAT.
NHRIs can provide print, radio and TV reporters with arguments supporting the rat-
ification of OP-CAT and encourage them to present these arguments to the gen-
eral public and public authorities. This may stimulate a broad debate about OP-CAT 
and how it can help to shape and put into operation national policies for the preven-
tion of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. NHRIs can also make sure that the debate is an inclusive one that reaches 
all relevant actors, including prison authorities, police officials, migration officials, 
judicial personnel, staff working in closed institutions for minors or in elderly people’s 
homes, to name but a few. Meetings with different stakeholders may also help the 
NHRI to refine their advocacy strategy.
NHRIs may also consider producing and disseminating materials that support their 
advocacy campaigns, containing more detailed information about the background, 
purpose and reach of OP-CAT. Furthermore, within the framework of a broad advo-
cacy campaign, NRHIs can hold seminars, roundtable discussions, lectures, press 
conferences and other events with the aim of generating broad support for the rati-
fication of OP-CAT. Such events can be organised together with NGOs, and should 
encourage the participation of all relevant actors.
NHRIs can also try to involve international actors and organisations such as the 
Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on Torture, the ICRC, and regional organi-
sations into their advocacy campaign directed at the ratification of OP-CAT. NHRIs 
in developing countries can, for example, contact organisations involved in the 
implementation of development projects, such as UNDP. UNDP frequently imple-
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) hold roundtable 
discussions on a plan of action that will lead to the ratification 
and implementation of OP-CAT in South Africa 
In April 2006, SAHRC and the Swiss-based NGO APT held roundtable discussions 
on OP-CAT in Johannesburg, South Africa. The meeting was convened as a means 
to open a national dialogue on the ratification and implementation of OP-CAT in 
South Africa. The report on the meeting lists the following objectives of the dis-
cussions:
“to share information on OP-CAT among relevant governmental, institutional ■■
and non-governmental stakeholders;
to assess the process of ratification of the OP-CAT by the South African govern-■■
ment;
to examine the implications for South Africa of the OP-CAT ratification; ■■
and to consider and reflect on the future implementation of the Protocol in ■■
South Africa.”
As a result of the roundtable discussions, SAHRC considered undertaking several 
activities with the aim of effecting ratification and implementation of OP-CAT in 
South Africa: a review of the legal and factual situation in all places of detention 
in South Africa; the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee on Torture with a 
mandate to lobby for the ratification of OP-CAT in South Africa and the crimi-
nalisation of torture in South African law, comprised of relevant actors such as 
members of the legislature, civil society organisations, government officials and 
existing visiting mechanisms; the dissemination of information about CAT and 
OP-CAT to all relevant actors, including to neighbouring countries; and addressing 
the conditions of detention of asylum seekers with appropriate means as a priority. 
Source: SAHRC/APT (2006): Report on the Roundtable Discussion on the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, April 2006. 
Available at: http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/downloads/OPCAT%20Roundtable% 20Discus-
sions%20Report.pdf 
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ments projects that aim to initiate security sector reform and promote greater dem-
ocratic oversight of the security sector.118 Such projects can profit from a debate 
about the ratification and implementation of OP-CAT. 
When ratification of OP-CAT is discussed at the national level, this can also include 
a debate about the possible shape, function and competences of an NPM, since in 
reality debates about ratification and implementation of OP-CAT will not be com-
pletely separate. NHRIs’ role in this debate is discussed below.
3.4.2 NHRI’s Role in the Implementation of OP-CAT
After a state has ratified OP-CAT, NHRIs will promote its actual implementation. 
This may include involvement in the discussion about the possible form, function 
and mandate of one or several NPMs; supportive activities in the actual establishment 
or designation of NPMs; and contributions to the implementation of the recommen-
dations of the NPMs and the Subcommittee on Prevention once they start operating. 
Some NHRIs will take on the function of the NPM themselves.
Discussing Form and Mandate of NPM 
The most important aim of NHRIs in the debate on the establishment of an NPM in 
their country is to make sure that the NPM conforms to the legal and operational 
requirements set out in OP-CAT. These requirements have been summarised above 
(see chapter 1.5).
In the context of a debate on the form and mandate of NPMs, NHRIs should ensure 
that existing monitoring schemes for places of detention are analysed carefully. 
Their legal basis, mandates and practices must be evaluated with regard to their 
conformity with the requirements set out in OP-CAT. Existing mechanisms to be 
reviewed include visiting schemes operated by NGOs, existing judicial offices, inde-
pendent boards of visitors and parliamentary committees. In countries where NHRIs 
have the competence to visit places of detention, this mechanism should be included 
in the review as well.
118   Among projects carried out under UNDP’s Sub-Practice “Crisis Prevention and Recovery”, UNDP pro-
motes justice and security sector reform in various countries. For more information see:  
http://www.undp.org/bcpr/we_do/security_reform.shtml.
Results of the review form the basis of the debate: it will reveal whether it is neces-
sary to establish a new NPM or whether existing monitoring mechanisms can re orient 
their work in light of OP-CAT. In federal states the question must be addressed of 
whether the NPM should be a loose association of several regional bodies, whether 
there should be a centralised body, or whether something in-between might be most 
suitable in a given national context. NHRIs can then contribute to an active involve-
ment and consultation of relevant stakeholders into the process of the establish-
ment or designation of a NPM. 
NHRIs should also make sure that NPMs in their country have the right to interact 
with the Subcommittee on Prevention without restrictions, and encourage such 
cooperation once the NPMs and the Subcommittee take up their work. In addition, 
NHRIs can ensure that the NPMs have a realistic budget available to operate effec-
tively. Where it is designated to act as an NPM itself, the NHRI’s own budget must 
be increased, and its founding instruments may have to be modified since its man-
date would include new responsibilities. 
Role of NHRIs in the Establishment / Designation of NPMs
After a decision on the shape and mandate of one or several NPMs has been made, 
NHRIs can actively support the operation of these NPMs. They may, for example, 
support NPMs in developing their working methods, and advise them on determin-
ing the frequency of visits to different places of detention. NHRIs may also provide 
or organise training for the designated members of NPMs, since the effectiveness 
of a monitoring mechanism largely depends on the professionalism of the visitors. 
To date, among the NPMs that have been established already, are some NHRIs 
accredited according to the Paris Principles. The models chosen for those NPMs differ 
strongly – in the case of Mexico the National Human Rights Commission was nom-
inated as the NPM, in the case of New Zealand the Human Rights Commission was 
designated to serve as the central NPM in cooperation with four other agencies.119 
119   Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) (2007): National Preventive Mechanisms – Country-by-
Country Status Report. Version of November 22, 2007, see  
http://www.apt.ch/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=44&Itemid=84 
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Supporting the Work of NPMs and the Subcommittee on Prevention
As soon as NPMs and the Subcommittee start to carry out their visits regularly, 
NHRIs can once again exercise a monitoring function of the mechanism and, as the 
case may be, report to CAT on the possible causes in the framework of the reporting 
cycle. A potential obstacle may be the confidentiality of the procedures – NHRI may 
encourage publication of the Subcommittee’s reports though. 
NHRIs may as well play a role in supporting the implementation of the NPM´s or 
the Subcommittee´s recommendations. They may, for example, advise relevant 
authorities on developing strategies for the implementation of recommendations. 
In cases where states are reluctant to implement recommendations of the Subcom-
mittee on Prevention, NHRIs will have the opportunity to encourage the Subcom-
mittee to conduct follow-up visits to relevant places of detention. The Subcommit-
tee has such possibilities under art. 13 (4) OP-CAT. A specific strategy to support 
the implementation may be training on international human rights standards on the 
prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment for police officers, officials 
working in detention facilities, the military, or other officials concerned.
3.5 NHRIs’ Role in Promoting Recent International Human Rights 
Treaties 
The CRPD aims to ensure visibility of disability issues within the international and 
national system for the promotion and protection of human rights, and in national 
and international politics in general. The ICPED intends to close gaps in IHRL of the 
protection and prevention of all persons from enforced disappearance. NHRIs can 
play an important role in promoting the visibility of disability issues and in closing 
the protection gaps regarding enforced disappearances by engaging in activities that 
support a speedy ratification and implementation of the CRPD and the ICPED. 
3.5.1 NHRIs’ Role in Promoting Ratification of CRPD and ICPED
To date, the CRPD has been signed by a considerable number of states, but was only 
ratified by a few, the same is true for its Optional Protocol.120 It will enter into force 
120   For a constantly updated status of ratification of the Convention and its Optional Protocol see:  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable  
after the 20th ratification. The ICPED has been signed by a number of states as well, 
will only enter into force after the 20th ratification though, too.121 NHRIs can, there-
fore, reasonably engage in activities that aim at the ratification of the CRPD, its 
Optional Protocol and the ICPED, so that these instruments can enter into force as 
soon as possible. Such activities might be similar to those that were discussed above 
with regard to the ratification of OP-CAT.
Conducting Research into the Situation of Persons with Disabilities and 
Enforced Disappearances
A number of NHRIs in all world regions have built up sound expertise in the field 
of human rights of persons with disabilities already as they contributed substan-
tially to the development of the CRPD.
To prepare ratification of CRPD, NHRIs can conduct research into the factual and 
legal situation of disabled persons and identify areas where persons with disabili-
ties are discriminated against and cannot enjoy their rights on an equal basis with 
others. Within the context of such research, NHRIs should also make sure that they 
clearly point out what new focus and added value the adoption of a human rights 
approach to disability issues will bring about for the well-being of disabled persons 
and society as a whole. 
Such research, probably undertaken in cooperation with specialized NGOs and inter-
est groups, would serve as an excellent foundation for advocacy campaigns for the 
Convention and it Optional Protocol.
Regarding the ICPED, NHRIs can analyse their country’s laws on whether they con-
tain sufficient protection of all persons from enforced disappearance, as set out in 
the ICPED, explore a potentially existing dimensions of forced disappearances in 
their country and identify protection gaps. Such research will allow NHRIs to sub-
stantiate the necessity for the ratification and implementation of ICPED. Ratifica-
tion of the ICPED can make a significant contribution to prevent the serious human 
rights violation of enforced disappearance that does not only cause harm to the 
disappeared person, but also to relatives, friends and often to the whole society.
121  See: http://www.bayefsky.com/html/enforced_ratif_table.php
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3.5.2 NHRIs’ Role in the Implementation of CRPD and ICPED
After their state has ratified CRPD and ICPED, NHRIs can start to undertake activities 
that aim at the further promotion and actual implementation of CRPD and ICPED. 
Explaining the overarching aims and basic concepts of CRPD and ICPED
It is an essential precondition for the effective implementation of CRPD that its 
overarching aims and basic concepts are well understood by the authorities respon-
sible for its implementation. NHRIs can therefore provide training on this new con-
vention and explain the CRPD’s human rights approach to disability issues: instead 
of, once again, addressing disability as a mere medical, charity, or social welfare 
issue, the convention promotes the recognition of diversity; the principles of non-
discrimination, participation and inclusion; individual autonomy and self-determi-
nation; equality of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and accessibility of 
infrastructure, communication services and other facilities. Most societies are far 
from understanding and much further from implementing this innovative concept. 
Through interaction with relevant authorities and other institutions with special 
responsibility for persons with disabilities, NHRIs can make sure that necessary legis-
lative and policy changes are made to guarantee compatibility of national legislation 
and policies with CRPD. NHRIs may assist in identifying the necessities for change, 
and pointing out means to effect such change. This might include assisting relevant 
authorities in collecting “appropriate information, including statistical and research 
data” that enables states to formulate and implement policies to give effect to 
CRPD.122 
As regards the ICPED, it is of great importance that NHRIs promote the criminali-
sation of enforced disappearance under national legislation. In order to guarantee 
the prevention of enforced disappearances, NHRIs shall make sure that the ICPED’s 
strict requirements to all situations in which persons are deprived of their liberty 
are included into national law. Also, the ICPED’s broad view of who is a victim of an 
enforced disappearance shall be introduced in national legislation, as well as the 
victims’ rights to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation. 
NHRIs may also urge for the adoption of legislation that determines the legal situa-
tion of a disappeared person whose fate has not been clarified. Such clarification 
may spare relatives of missing persons from additional difficulties. 
122  Art. 31 (1) CRPD.
Discussing the Implementation of art. 33 (2) CRPD 
The implementation of art. 33 (2) CRPD might be of particular importance for NHRIs. 
Under this Article, NHRIs might be given the explicit mandate to “promote, protect 
and monitor” the implementation of CRPD. This would include various channels of 
interaction with the yet to be established Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, similar to the interaction between NHRIs and existing TBs that has been 
discussed in previous sections.
But it is not necessarily existing NHRIs that are to take on the activities spelled out 
in art. 33 (2) CRPD. Depending on their administrative and legal systems, states may 
also establish new bodies that are specifically responsible for promoting, protecting 
and monitoring the implementation of the CRPD. Therefore, regarding the implemen-
tation of art. 33 (2) CRPD, NHRIs can initiate and provide input into a discussion 
about the most suitable way to monitor the implementation of CRPD in a given 
national context. This may include the elaboration on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of establishing a new body solely responsible for monitoring the implemen-
tation of CRPD, or integrating such a monitoring function into an existing NHRI. 
For example, the establishment of a separate body might attract more funding and 
might be able to specialise to a greater extent on disability issues. Extending the 
mandate of an existing NHRI to cover CRPD might, however, better guarantee that 
disability becomes an integral part of the general human rights framework within 
a specific country. 
Preparing cooperation with the Committee on Enforced Disappearances
Art. 28 (1) ICPED refers to “all relevant state institutions agencies or offices work-
ing towards the protection of all persons against enforced disappearances” and calls 
on the Committee to cooperate with these. While this is not a provision shaping a 
special monitoring institution for the ICPED at the national level, it may still inspire 
NHRIs to prepare an overview on who these institutions are in their respective coun-
try and to reflect on adequate modalities of cooperation between these institutions, 
the Committee and the NHRI itself.
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As underlined by the UNHCHR, the effectiveness of the treaty body system must be 
assessed by the extent of national implementation of recommendations.123 The 
analysis in chapter 3 should have shown that, at least for those countries that have 
a NHRI according to the Paris Principles – and their number is growing – systematic 
cooperation between the NHRI with TBs bears a real potential to improve the human 
rights situation of rights holders – in regard to questions as different as the right 
to health, the right to a fair trial or the right to equal access to both of them.
NHRIs and TBs have, as the examples in chapter 3 show, begun to cooperate in respect 
to different TB mechanisms. NHRIs are aware that they still have to learn about TB 
mechanisms and procedures, but they are committed to undertake the steps required 
to improve co-operation with treaty bodies. They also intend to learn more on related 
issues such as the functioning of treaty bodies, harmonisation of national legislation 
with international human rights standards or the interaction with TBs within the 
reporting cycle.
On another level, NHRIs and TBs have also sought opportunities to discuss further 
perspectives of closer collaboration. Representatives of the ICC were invited to the 
Inter-Committee Meetings and Meetings of Chairpersons of TBs, and in late 2006 
the OHCHR, the German and the Danish Institutes for Human Rights hosted a round-
table on the role of NHRIs and TBs. The roundtable concluded with a set of recom-
mendations to NHRIs (“Action Points”) and to TBs (“Draft Harmonized Approach”) 
to improve and broaden their cooperation.124 This document serves as a basis for 
123   UNHCHR’s Concept Paper: OHCHR (2006): Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a 
Unified Standing Treaty Body. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006, para 4.
124   6th Inter-Committee Meeting / 19th Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(2007): Conclusions of the International Roundtable on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions 
and Treaty Bodies. UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/3, 12 January 2007.
further discussions between TBs and NHRIs and was endorsed by a Workshop of 
National Human Rights Institutions and Treaty Bodies in Geneva in November 
2007.125
At the occasion of the 6th Inter-Committee Meeting of TB members in 2007, the ICC 
submitted three requests to TBs and asked them to take these up in their debates 
on a harmonised TB system: 
  
Recognition of NHRIs as independent actors
This handbook should have made sufficiently clear that NHRIs already play an inte-
resting role and have the potential to play a much bigger one in bringing forward 
the implementation of human rights treaties at the national level through their 
interaction with TBs and the follow up to TBs’ recommendations. However, NHRIs 
can only unfold their distinguished role to the full extent if all actors concerned 
recognise it: NHRIs themselves can seize many more opportunities to relate to TBs 
and TBs can interact on many more levels with NHRIs than they currently do. In 
addition, other actors should recognise NHRIs’ role, such as UNDP and other develop-
ment agencies, but also to actors like UNICEF or UNIFEM, and many intergovern-
mental and non-governmental institutions involved in the implementation of inter-
national human rights law. 
Communication / Transparency
NHRIs need information that is easily accessible and transparent, on how to inter-
act and cooperate with the UN treaty bodies. An informative website, guidelines or 
other information instruments would help NHRIs to approach TBs on different mat-
ters in a qualified and effective fashion. A clear entry point for NHRIs would serve 
the same purpose. An improved and systematic exchange of information between 
NHRIs and UN TBs would keep NHRIs constantly informed about all aspects of the 
TBs’ work and vice versa. Both levels would benefit from enhanced communication 
with each other: TB recommendations support and inspire NHRI working priorities, 
NHRI feedback may help TBs to refine and adjust their advice to states parties. 
125   OHCHR: Workshop of National Human Rights Institutions and Treaty Bodies, Geneva, 26–28 November 2007, 
Conclusions, on file with authors.
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Harmonisation of TB working methods 
While closer collaboration between TBs and NHRIs will certainly make a difference, 
NHRIs as stakeholders of the different TB mechanisms do have an interest in struc-
tural adjustments among TBs and a harmonised approach to their procedures. For 
NHRIs any harmonisation of working methods of TBs regarding their approach to 
NHRIs will be most welcome. Common guidelines by all TBs for interaction with 
NHRIs would be particularly helpful – on all areas of cooperation: the steps of the 
states reporting process, the individual complaints procedures, the inquiry proce-
dures, and for any special areas of common concern as for example for the coope-
ration with the Subcommittee on Prevention established under OP-CAT. 
These requests have been received with appreciation by TB members and the coming 
years will most probably bring both levels closer to each other. Enhanced coopera-
tion will help to integrate national and international mechanisms for the promotion 
and protection of human rights and address many problems of the current system, 
such as information and coordination gaps, and inadequate follow-up procedures. 
It will also expand the likelihood that NHRIs make the UN TB system better known at 
the national level. States parties, too, recognize the role of their NHRI and promote 
their active participation in the reporting cycle and with regard to other TB mecha-
nisms.  
 
TBs and NHRIs, in cooperation with partners such as the OHCHR, keep an ongoing 
dialogue on the best means to achieve enhanced implementation, better visibility 
of human rights guarantees and smooth coordination among key actors. This hand-
book seeks to promote and provide fresh input into this discussion.
APT    Association for the Prevention of Torture 
CAT     Committee Against Torture / Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
CEDAW    Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women / Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women
CERD    Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR    Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CHRC    Canadian Human Rights Commission
CMW    Committee on Migrant Workers
CNDH    Mexican National Human Rights Commission 
CoE     Council of Europe
CRC     Committee on the Rights of the Child / Convention on the 
Rights of the Child
CRPD    Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
ECHR    European Convention on Human Rights
ECOSOC    Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECtHR    European Court on Human Rights
EU     European Union
GIHR   German Institute for Human Rights
HRC    Human Rights Council (UN)
HRCttee   Human Rights Committee (UN)
HREOC   Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (Australia)
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IACHR   Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICC     International Co-ordinating Committee of National Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
ICCPR    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCPR-OP1   Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
ICCPR-OP2   Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
ICERD    International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination
ICESCR    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICM     Inter-Committee Meeting
ICPED    International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
ICRC    International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICRMW    International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
IHL     International Humanitarian Law
IHRC    Irish Human Rights Commission
IHRL    International Human Rights Law
NGO    Non-Govermental Organisation
NHRI    National Human Rights Institution 
NPM    National Preventive Mechanism 
OHCHR    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OP-CAT    Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OP-CEDAW   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women
OP-CRC-AC   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
OP-CRC-SC   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
SAHRC    South African Human Rights Commission 
SUHAKAM   Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 
TB     United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body
UN     United Nations
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA    United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM   United Nations Development Fund for Women 
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